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ABSTRACT

Oppressed, outvoted, and outgunned, minority shareholders have
an obvious solution for their woes: vote with their feet, sell their shares,
and leave the company. But this "Wall Street Rule" is only available to
shareholders in publicly listed corporations; shareholders in close
corporations-privatelyowned business entities with no market for
their shares-do not have the option of easy exit. Legal solutions which
enable the shareholderto voluntarily exit a company with their capital
such as the oppression or unfair prejudice remedies in US and AngloCommonwealth corporate law-what this Article classifies as
"withdrawalremedies"--are therefore vital in close corporations.
However, until relatively recently, shareholders in Japan's close
corporations had no access to withdrawal under corporate law, as
neitherof Japan'sthen-dominant close corporationforms offered it. By
revealing how shareholder litigants, attorneys, and judges in Japan
respondedto the absence of withdrawal, this Article shows how Japan's
experience was no outlier among nations, but instead powerfully
demonstratesthe importanceof withdrawal remedies in practice. Later,
withdrawal remedies at law for close corporationsbecame available in
Japanfor the first time with the watershed Kaisha-ho (Companies Act)
of 2005, which introduced a new close corporation form, the Godo
Kaisha (GK). This Article analyzes the challenges facing Japan's new
withdrawal regime and shows how comparative corporatelaw-armed
with the law and experience of withdrawal in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Germany-offers valuable insights for the
development of withdrawal in the world's second largest developed
economy.

Keywords: comparative corporate law, close corporations, shareholder
remedies, Japan, withdrawal

and social distancing, in departure from usual practice, I as the author alone take full
responsibility for the accuracy of the non-English-language sources cited and the
propositions advanced herein that are based on non-English-language sources.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Oppressed, outvoted, and outgunned minority shareholders have
an obvious solution for their woes: vote with their feet, sell their shares,
and leave the company. But this "Wall Street Rule" is only applicable
to shareholders in publicly listed corporations. What if selling your
shares on the stock market is simply not an option-because there is
no market for them? Although the importance of shareholder exit is

taken for granted by corporate governance scholars devoted to the
study of public corporations, exit's equally essential role in close
corporations-privately owned business entities for which a market for
shares does not exist 1-is often overlooked. Legal solutions enabling

the shareholder to voluntarily exit a company with their capital such

2
as the oppression or unfair prejudice remedies in the United States

and Anglo-Commonwealth

1.

3

corporate law-which are defined as

See infra Part II.A (describing close corporations).

See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 7:11 (rev.
2d ed., 2004) (loose-leaf) [hereinafter O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
2.

THOMPSON'S

SHAREHOLDERS] (detailing oppression and unfair prejudice remedies in the United
States).
3.
The oppression or unfair prejudice remedy has been adopted by jurisdictions
including Australia, Canada (federal), Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, and the
United Kingdom. For the various statutory regimes, see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.),
§§ 232-35 (Austl.); Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, §§ 238, 241-
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"withdrawal remedies" in this Article 4-are therefore vital in close
corporations. This family of doctrinally distinct but functionally
equivalent legal solutions is ubiquitous and well-established in the

world's leading corporate law jurisdictions-the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Germany 5-save

one: Japan.

Until relatively recently, shareholders in Japan's close
corporations had no access to withdrawal under the law, as neither of
Japan's then-dominant close corporation forms-the Kabushiki Kaisha
(KK) ("Stock Corporation") and the Yagen Kaisha (YK) ("Limited
Liability Corporation")-offered it.6 This omission attracted little
attention in international corporate law literature and was

unremedied by both judicial development and statutory reform despite
the efforts of Japanese scholars influenced by foreign law models.7 By
revealing how shareholders and other stakeholders in Japan
responded to the absence of withdrawal, this Article shows how
Japan's experience powerfully demonstrates
withdrawal remedies in practice.8

the

importance

of

After decades without withdrawal, in 2005 things changed-but
not quite as one might expect. It was not the country's venerable close
corporation forms that finally received long-overdue withdrawal
rights; rather, a new close corporation form, the Godo Kaisha (GK), as
introduced by the watershed Kaisha-ho ("Companies Act"), 9 came with
withdrawal rights. A legislative invention inspired by the American

limited liability company (LLC) and with no relationship to the YK, the
GK was conceptualized as a third member of a new legal category, the
Mochibun Kaisha (membership companies), which is separate and
distinct from both the KK and YK.1 0 The availability of withdrawal in

the GK flowed from this quirk of legal classification, rather than as any
belated response to earlier serious (but ultimately defeated) reform
efforts arising from the problems associated with the lack of
withdrawal in the KK and YK, or as any result of inspiration from the

42 (Can.); Companies Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 622, §§ 723-27 (H.K.); Companies Act
1993, §§ 174-75 (N.Z.); Companies Act (Cap. 50, rev. ed. 2006) § 216 (Sing.); Companies
Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 994-96 (U.K.).
4.
See infra Part II.B (discussing the definition and disambiguation of
withdrawal).
5.
See infra Part II.C (discussing withdrawal remedies in these jurisdictions).
See infra Part IIA-B (discussing the KK and YK and the absence of
6.
withdrawal).
7.
See infra Part III.C.1-2 (discussing how scholars in Japan perceived the
phenomenon of withdrawal's absence and the failed legislative attempt at introducing
withdrawal).

8.
This is the goal of Part III. C.
9.
Kaisha-h6 [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005 (Japan). The GK is regulated
under its own Part. See id. arts. 575-675 (comprising Part III of the Kaisha-ho, which
regulates the GK).
10.
See infra Part IV.A.1 (providing background to the GK's introduction); Part
IV.A.2 (defining mochibun kaisha).
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United States.1 1 The advent of the GK presents corporate law jurists
with a historic opportunity: a near-blank slate on which conflicts in a
new close corporation entity can be solved without the baggage of bad
precedent or outdated doctrine. Although Japanese jurists working on

the GK have often looked to the United States as a source of inspiration
and ideas, this Article offers a different perspective; it argues that
withdrawal remedies developed in the United Kingdom and Germany
12
offer greater guidance from a comparative perspective.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part II first introduces the central
features of close corporations and the concept of "withdrawal
remedies," and then briefly introduces their operation in the United

States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Part III sets out the historical
context to Japan's close corporation law, and proceeds to identity-and
offer a nuanced answer to-an unnoticed (in Western literature) but
critical puzzle: If withdrawal is essential for close corporations, how

did Japanese corporations and shareholders survive without it for so
long? Part IV follows with a concise introduction to Japan's new close

corporation form, the GK, highlighting its features and legal
significance; some clarifications as to terminology will also be made.
Part V is a detailed examination of Japan's withdrawal regime-the

first such analysis in the English language. Part VI takes stock of the
GK's growing importance, and offers comparative insights from the
United States, United Kingdom, and Germany for the development of
the GK's withdrawal regime. Notwithstanding the lack of

jurisprudence and awareness about the GK's withdrawal regime and
the KK's continued popularity as a close corporation entity despite the
absence of withdrawal, the GK's ascendance makes withdrawal a rare
and valuable opportunity for comparative corporate law jurists to make
an impact on close corporation law: the corporate law of the ordinary
businessperson.

11.

See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how withdrawal became a feature of the

12.

This argument is developed in Part VI.B below.

GK).
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II. WITHDRAWAL REMEDIES AND CLOSE CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

A.

Close Corporations:Featuresand Problems

Close corporations, like all business corporations, possess
standard corporate characteristics, such as separate legal personality
(entity shielding) and formal separation at law of share ownership and
management power. 13 Although impossible to define with certainty,1 4
"close corporations" are associated with specific characteristics,
particularly restrictions on shareholder exit and informal management
arrangements.

Restrictions on shareholder exit. Although equity interests in
corporations may be freely transferred,1 5 shares of close corporations
are typically subject to share transfer restrictions, whether
mandatory' 6 or as adopted by the company's constitution.1 7 Lack of
secondary markets for such shares 18
means that unhappy
shareholders do not have the option of following the "Wall Street Rule"
and selling their shares on the stock market.1 9 Thus, share transfer

13.
REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY B.
HANSMANN, GtRARD HERTIG, KLAUS J. HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD B. ROCK, THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5 (3d ed.,

Oxford University Press 2017).
14. Robert A. Kessler, The ABA Close Corporation Statute, 36 MERCER L. REV.
661, 661 (1985) ("[A] close corporation [is] like a spiral staircase: difficult to define, but
you know one when you see it.").
15.
KRAAKMAN, ARMOUR, DAVIES, ENRIQUES, HANSMANN, HERTIG, HOPT, KANDA

& ROCK, supra note 13, at 10.
16.
See, e.g., Kaisha-ho [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 585 (Japan)
(prescribing the conditions on which equity interests in membership companies may be
transferred).

17.
See, e.g., Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung
[GmbHG] [Limited Liabilities Company Act], July 17, 2017, BGBL I at 7, § 15(5) (Ger.)
("The articles of association may stipulate that the transfer of shares be made dependent
on further conditions, in particular the company's consent."); Kaisha-ho, art. 107(1)(i)
(giving stock corporations the option to condition the assignment of shares on approval
by the corporation); Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 544(1) (U.K.) ("The shares or other
interest of any member in a company are transferable in accordance with the company's
articles.").

18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(3) (2020) (prohibiting a Delaware
statutory "close corporation" from making an "offering of any of its stock of any class
which would constitute a 'public offering' "); F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:2 (rev.

3d ed. 2004) (loose-leaf) (noting the lack of a market for minority shareholders' shares of
closely held corporations) [hereinafter O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS
AND LLCS].

19.

Harvey Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of

CorporationLaw, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 275 (2008); GREGOR BACHMANN, HORST
EIDENMOLLER, ANDREAS ENGERT, HOLGER FLEISCHER & WOLFGANG SCHON,
REGULATING THE CLOSED CORPORATION 6-7, 35 (De Gruyter 2014).
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restrictions often translate into stable shareholding structures in close
20
corporations with permanent majorities and minorities.

Informal

management

arrangements.

Shareholders

often

participate directly in close corporation management as directors,
employees, or both. 21 The absence of clear separation between
ownership and control creates organizational and managerial

problems distinct from public, widely held corporations. Overlap
between management and shareholders and the small number of
shareholders in a close corporation aligns the interests of the two
classes. 22 Conflicts between directors and shareholders-the
dominant agency problem in widely held corporations-are thus rare'
in close corporations. 23 Instead, the primary problem is conflict
particularly majority/controlling versus
shareholders,
between

minority shareholders. Despite advantages associated with the strong
personal relationships between co-shareholders,24 there is a downside:
conflicts between shareholders are the "Achilles heel" of the close
corporation. 25 Rent-seeking behavior aside, personal conflicts may
26
with potentially devastating
also spill over into the business realm

consequences for the corporation's operational health or even its
continued existence. 2 7

20.

BACHMANN, EIDENMOLLER, ENGERT, FLEISCHER & SCHON, supra note 19, at

34.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency
21.
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273 (1986) (noting that in a close corporation "the firm's
principal investors are also its managers"); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close
Corporations,24 J. CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999) (noting that in close corporations there is
"substantial overlap between suppliers of capital and suppliers of labor").
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 273-74 (arguing that agency
22.
costs are reduced in a close corporation because the small number of participants

facilitates monitoring and because these participants are simultaneously managers and
residual risk bearers).
23.

BACHMANN, EIDENMGLLER, ENGERT, FLEISCHER & SCHON, supra note 19, at

8.
Id. at 31; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 274 (describing the
24.
advantages of shareholder relationships in close corporations).
Mette Neville, A Statutory Buy-Out Right in SMEs - An Important Corporate
25.
Governance Mechanism and Minority Protection?, in COMPANY LAW AND SMES 247, 247
(Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig Sorensen eds., Thomson Reuters 2010); see also Sandra
K. Miller, Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the European
Community: A ComparativeAnalysis of the German, United Kingdom, and French "Close
Corporation Problem", 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 381, 383 (1997) ("Shareholder disputes
present one of the most difficult and potentially destructive problems which arise in the
context of the close corporation.").
26.
See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of
Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1208
(2009) (observing that "family quarrels and soured friendships often lead to punitive
business consequences" in close corporations).
O'NEAL AND THOMPSON's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra
27.
note 2, §1:4; see also BACHMANN, EIDENMOLLER, ENGERT, FLEISCHER & SCHON, supra

note 19, at 31.
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Shareholder conflicts may arise when the majority and minority
disagree on issues such as business direction or fundamental changes
such as the sale or restructuring of the business. 28 Other conflict
situations include unmet minority expectations on returns or
participation in the business; or the exercise of rights or powers by the
majority in ways that are abusive or harmful to the minority.29 Absent
special legal rules for the protection of the minority, the result is most

often a fait accompli in favor of the majority; this is because the
principle of majority rule grants majority shareholders substantial
control over the majority-minority shareholder relationship.3 0
Not only are minority shareholders vulnerable to majority
opportunism, the combination of share transfer restrictions and lack of
easy exit options leaves them with few options. Minority shareholders
are outvoted by definition and have no legal power to terminate
conflicts in ways that produce results favorable to them. Without
special protections, they are left in a particularly weak position vis-&-

vis the majority. When serious disagreements arise over the strategic
direction or mismanagement of the corporation, capital lock-in reduces
the power of an immobile, outvoted minority to place pressure on
management to address concerns regarding business direction,
efficiency, or profitability. 31 An even more serious possibility is that
majority shareholders may use their management and/or shareholder
rights to extract benefits for themselves at the expense of the
corporation and minority shareholders. 32 The risk of minority

shareholder exploitation is therefore inherent and characteristic of the
close corporation.3 3

28.
Neville, supra note 25, at 258 (noting the potential for ordinary business
disagreements to escalate into conflict).
29.
Id.
30.

See BACHMANN, EIDENMULLER, ENGERT, FLEISCHER & SCHON, supra note 19,

at 33.
31.
See id. at 35; Rock & Wachter, supra note 21, at 916 (noting that "the parties
[are] locked into their investments to a much greater extent than in either the
partnership or the publicly traded corporation", and "minority shareholders are
particularly vulnerable if there is a falling-out with the majority"); Neville, supra note
25, at 247-48 (pointing out that efficiency may not necessarily be a priority, leading to
inefficient management and shareholder conflicts), 276-77 (lack of exit opportunities are
especially acute in poorly-managed companies, and this undermines the minority
shareholder's ability to exert pressure on management and controlling shareholders to
make improvements).
32.
MARKUS KOEHNEN, OPPRESSION AND RELATED REMEDIES 448-49 (Thomson
Carswell 2004); BACHMANN, EIDENMOLLER, ENGERT, FLEISCHER & SCHON, supra note

19, at 9-10.
33.
Means, supra note 26, at 1209.
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B. Exit by Withdrawal as the Necessary Ultimate Solution
The close corporation's two distinctive problems may be simply
stated: conflicts between shareholders, and the need for minority

shareholder protection. Shareholder conflicts may theoretically be
resolved between the parties through dispute resolution mechanisms
or temporary external intervention. External interventions include
provisional directors that can vote to break deadlocks, 34 and

alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation. 35
However, the efficacy of dispute resolution mechanisms or external
interventions not involving exit of either party is limited to situations
in which the conflict is not intractable, or where parties are committed

to resolving the dispute. 36 Instead of resolving the conflict, temporary
external interventions may even exacerbate matters if parties prove

unable to reach a mutually agreeable compromise over a prolonged
period of time, and would also be unacceptably intrusive if
Similarly, judicial orders
administered over the long term. 3
invalidating or restraining prejudicial acts do not by themselves put an

end to shareholder conflict. As one national supreme court pertinently
observed,
[iJf the majority and minority cannot get along, litigation is not likely to improve
matters between them. Anything short of a divorce is an invitation for repeat
litigation in future. Thus, although the court may "direct or prohibit any act or
cancel or vary any transaction or resolution" or "regulate the conduct of the
affairs of the company in future", such orders are likely to provide only temporary
relief.

38

J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A
34.
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REV.
1, 20-21 (1977).
MAXIMILIAN GOETTE, DER EXIT DER MINDERHEIT AUS DER GMBH [EXIT OF THE
35.
MINORITY FROM THE GMBH] 45-49 (Carl Heymanns 2014).

Id. at 45, 50-52; see Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 34, at 21 ("[The]
36.
remedy [of appointing a provisional director] ... is likely to work best where it is least
needed, in resolving trivial disagreements.").
See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 34, at 21-25 (discussing some
37.
consequences of judicial remedies involving supervision of or other intervention into
corporate affairs).
Sembcorp Marine Ltd. v. PPL Holdings Pte Ltd. [2013] SGCA 43, [2013] 4
38.
SLR 193 ¶ 158 (Sing. Ct. App.) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wee Meng Seng,
Membership and Members' Rights, in WALTER WOON ON COMPANY LAW ¶ 5.97 (Tan
Cheng Han ed., rev. 3d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2009)); see also PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH
WORTHINGTON, GoWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 680

¶

20-19 (10th ed.,

Sweet & Maxwell 2016) ("When business and, often, personal relations between quasipartners have broken down and are incapable of reconstitution by a court, the only

effective remedy is the minority's exit.").
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Ultimately, there must come a parting of the ways in cases of
shareholder conflict not resolvable otherwise. 39 This is why exit
solutions-such as withdrawal-fulfill a much-needed role.
For this Article, withdrawal is defined as "shareholder exit that

occurs at the election of the shareholder desirous of exit and creates a
monetary claim of the withdrawing shareholder for the value of their
shares." Note that shareholder "exit," a term not infrequently
encountered in close corporation literature, 40 is not synonymous with
"withdrawal." Here, "exit" is defined more broadly as "any legal
mechanism by which a shareholder terminates their status as
shareholder and the legal rights and obligations between the
shareholder and the corporation and between the exiting shareholder
and the other shareholders." So defined, "exit" encompasses not just
"withdrawal," but also appraisal, dissolution, and even the voluntary
transfer of shares by a shareholder to another person.4 1 Comprising
supplementary or baseline protection via statute, case law, doctrine, or
some combination thereof,42 withdrawal is to be distinguished from

both ex ante self-help measures, such as buy-sell agreements, as well
as self-help remedies predicated on majority power. 4 3
With withdrawal offering minorities the possibility of leaving the
corporation, minorities would not be subjected to majority power
indefinitely.4 4 Successful invocation of withdrawal achieves the basic
objective of putting an end to the shareholder conflict by facilitating
shareholder exit. A direct and potent response to majority opportunism

and inter-shareholder conflict,
minority's last-and best-hope.
C.

withdrawal

is the

beleaguered

Withdrawal as a Common Feature in Leading Economies

Perhaps the most compelling evidence for withdrawal remedies as
an essential part of the solution to intractable shareholder conflict is

that such remedies exist in developed corporate law jurisdictions. 4 5

39.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

40.
See e.g., BACHMANN, EIDENMULLER, ENGERT, FLEISCHER & ScHON, supra
note 19, at 66-68; PAUL P. DE VRIES, EXIT RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN A
PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY (Kiuwer 2010).

41.
See infra Part III.B (discussing the availability of exit mechanisms-but not
withdrawal-in Japan's two historical leading close corporation forms).
42.
It is a "widely acknowledged" notion that supplementary minority protection
as a matter of general law in addition to any contractually-bargained protection is
"indispensable." Holger Fleischer, Comparative Corporate Governance in Closely Held
Corporations, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 679, 707

(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., Oxford University Press 2018).
43.
E.g., formal squeeze-out techniques or expulsion. See generally O'NEAL AND
THOMPSON's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, chs. 3-6
(discussing various techniques used to squeezeout minority shareholders).
44.
GOETTE, supra note 35, at 21.
45.
See generally Fleischer, supra note 42, at 701-03, 704.
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Before delving into Japan's unique circumstances, it is worth taking a

step back to consider other selected leading developed economies.
There is no single corporate law for the United States; each of the
fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the inhabited territories

(collectively "states") have their own corporation statutes and case law.
Many states offer close corporation shareholders "oppression"
remedies,4 6 some of which provide for withdrawal by express statutory
48
In the LLC, withdrawal
provision 4 7 and others through case law.

remedies were historically available as of right across most of the
United States, 4 9 and several states today continue to offer withdrawal
5 0 Withdrawal's gradual
as a default feature for members of LLCs.

retreat in LLC statutes appears to be driven by tax considerationsb1
and

has occurred

without

consideration

of the implications

of

52
abolishing or curtailing withdrawal on the close corporation problem.
53
arguably the United Kingdom's
The "unfair prejudice" remedy,

most popular shareholder remedy, permits a plaintiff-shareholder to
apply to court for relief on the grounds that the conduct of the

company's affairs or an act (past or proposed) by or on behalf of the

54
to the plaintiff. The
company is or would be "unfairly prejudicial"
such order as it
"make
to
statute empowers the court with discretion

See generally O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
46.
SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, § 7:11 (describing "oppression" remedies and giving
examples from various states); see also id. § 7:12 (discussing remedies based on
"reasonable expectations").
See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(b)(11) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:147.
1435-1-1436 (2018); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489(1)(e) (West 2006); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.751(2) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-115(4) (West 2013);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8) (West 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.952(2)(k), (5) (2015).
See, e.g., G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 244 (Ind. 2001).
48.
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs in Limited Liability
49.
Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 514 n.95 (1995) (collecting and describing sources);
see also Uniform Limited Liability Company Act §§ 601(1), 603(a)(1), 701 (NAT'L CONF.
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS amended 1996) [hereinafter ULLCA 1996].
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1325(B), (C) (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, §§
50.
32, 36 (West 1995); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.081, 347.103(2), 347.121(1) (West 1997).
See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company:
51.
Learning (Or Not) From Close CorporationHistory, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 93240 (2005) [hereinafter Moll, Minority Oppression] (discussing how changes in federal
income taxation of LLCs allowing LLCs to freely elect taxation as a partnership or
corporation removed the incentives of states to maintain withdrawal rights as a way of
distinguishing LLCs from corporations; and how states, in attempting to make LLCs
attractive business entities for estate and gift tax reasons, abolished withdrawal rights
to reduce liquidity of LLC interests and thereby reduce the valuation of LLC interests
for federal tax purposes).
See Douglas K. Moll, JudicialDissolution of the Limited Liability Company:
52.
A Statutory Analysis, 19 TRANSAcTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 81, 106-07 (2017) [hereinafter
Moll, Judicial Dissolution] (suggesting that states were unaware of or had overlooked
the need to protect minority members from oppressive conduct in an earlier era when
exit rights were common).
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 994-96 (U.K.).
53.
Id. § 994(1).
54.
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thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of' 55
and specifies a nonexhaustive list of reliefs that the court may grant. 56
Court-ordered relief most commonly takes the form of a judiciallyordered buyout, 57 demonstrating the worth and centrality of
withdrawal to the United Kingdom's shareholder remedies regime. 58
Germany is arguably the earliest major jurisdiction to recognize a

general withdrawal remedy (Austritt aus wichtigem Grund) for
shareholders of the predominant Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter
Haftung (GmbH) closed corporation form despite the absence of
express statutory provision. 69 Notwithstanding the GmbH's
beginnings as a revolutionary invention of the German legislature,
GmbH law has been little touched by major legislative reform but
rather primarily shaped through German court decisions and academic
literature. Member withdrawal ("Austritt") for "good cause" (wichtiger

Grund) is an example of this par excellence. The flexible core concept of
"wichtiger Grund," which supports withdrawal in a wide variety of
circumstances, powerfully demonstrates withdrawal's value in the

close corporation context.

55.
Id. § 996(1).
56. Id. § 996(2).
57.
Grace v. Biagioli [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1222, [2006] 2 BCLC 70, [75] (Eng.)
(Patten, J.) ("In most cases, the usual order to make will be the one requiring the
respondents to buy out the petitioning shareholder at a price to be fixed by the court.
This is normally the most appropriate order to deal with intra-company disputes
involving

small

private

companies.");

ROBIN

HOLLINGTON,

HOLLINGTON

ON

SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS ¶ 8-44 (8th ed. Sweet & Maxwell 2017) ("The most important
and commonly granted remedy, mentioned in s.996(2)(e), is an order for the purchase of
the petitioner's shares either by another member or the company."); David Neuberger,
Company Law Reform: The Role of the Courts, in THE REFORM OF UNITED KINGDOM
COMPANY LAW 59, 69 (John de Lacey ed., Cavendish Publishing 2002).
58.
See generally DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 38, ¶ 20-19 (linking the
popularity of the unfair prejudice remedy to the buyout order (i.e., withdrawal)).
59.
The leading cases are Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice]
Apr. 1, 1953, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSAcHEN [BGHZ] 9,
157 (Ger.) and Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 16, 1991,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 116, 359 (Ger.).

Most commentaries on the German GmbHG (Law on Limited Liability Companies) will
have a chapter or section under the commentary to § 34 or as an appendix to § 34; see
also GOETTE, supra note 35, at 97-143. For English sources, see DE VRIES, supra note

40, ch. 4; Tobias Brinkman, Minority Protection under Section 459 of the CompaniesAct
1985: A Comparisonwith the Law of the German GmbH (PrivateLimited Company), 13
EUR. BUs. L. REV. 55, 78-79 (2002) (considering the withdrawal remedy [in the cited
article, "right to resign"] in the context of valuation clauses in companies' articles of
association, which companies use in attempts to provide alternative methods of share
valuation for withdrawing shareholders, potentially to minority shareholders'
disadvantage); Hugh T. Scogin, Jr., Withdrawal and Expulsion in Germany: A
Comparative Perspective on the "Close CorporationProblem", 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127,
138-54 (1993) (detailing the development of the withdrawal remedy in Germany, dating
back as far as 1930).
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What about Japan, the second-largest economy for much of the
postwar era, and which continues to be the second-largest developed
economy in the world? The full story of withdrawal's place in Japan's

close corporation law-spanning from the postwar era to the presenthas yet to be told in English or Japanese. It unfolds over the next three
Parts (III to V) in two acts. Part III presents a somewhat inconvenient

historical truth: Japan's close corporations in the past did not have
access to a withdrawal regime under Japanese corporate law. If

withdrawal is crucial for close corporations, how did Japanese
businesses thrive for decades despite its absence? Careful examination
reveals that the Japanese developed workarounds and attemptedand failed-to create a withdrawal regime by law. The past ends and

the present begins with the 2005 Kaisha-ho, when a new close
60
corporation was introduced, which included a withdrawal regime.

Critical analysis of this new entity and withdrawal regime are
respectively the subjects of Parts IV and V.
III. THE PAST: THE CONTEXT AND PUZZLE OF JAPAN'S CLOSE
CORPORATION LAW

If there is a single event in the postwar era marking when
Japanese corporate law of the "past" ended and "contemporary"
Japanese corporate law began, it would be the enactment of the
Kaisha-ho in 2005.61 In this Part, the hitherto untold story of Japan's
close corporation law and withdrawal before 2005 unfolds to revealand resolve-a historical mystery: How did the world's second-largest
economy get by without offering a withdrawal regime for its close
corporations?

A. Japan's Two Close Corporation Forms: Kabushiki Kaisha ("KK")
and Yngen Kaisha ("YK")
Before 2005, the two corporate forms used most often for close
corporations were the KK62 ("Stock Corporation" 63) and the YK

See infra Part IV.
60.
See generally Kaisha-ho [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005 (Japan).
61.
62.
Due to a Japanese morphophonological phenomenon known as rendaku (iAN%
?# , A41 , _, n lr, #, etc.,
), when preceded by a modifier such as A-4, A,
the word F9f is usually pronounced gaisha (not kaisha) in speech. However, for clarity,
rendaku will be largely disregarded in this Article.
63.
I use the word "corporation" deliberately to distinguish the KK from the
mochibun kaisha ("membership company"). Cf. infra note 169. In so doing I depart from
"stock company", which is the preferred translation of the latest edition of the semiofficial dictionary adopted by the Japanese Government. JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION
COUNCIL, STANDARD LEGAL TERMS DICTIONARY 54 (ver. 11.0, Mar. 2019), JAPANESE LAW
at
available
COUNCIL,
TRANSLATION

http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/dict/download?re=2

(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
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("Limited Liability Corporation"). A creature of Japan's venerable Shoho (Commercial Code), 64 the KK came to be widely used by small, even
de facto single-owner businesses in the postwar era. 65 Although share

transfer restrictions were legally prohibited in KKs for some years, this
prohibition posed no practical obstacle to the KK's adoption as a close
corporation form; even before their legalization in 1966, a significant
proportion of small KKs had some form of share transfer restrictions. 6 6
Terminologically, equity interests in KKs are "shares" (kabu)67 and
holders of these interests are "shareholders" (kabunushi).68
The YK, Japan's second close corporation form before 2005, was

introduced in 1938 by the Yagen Kaisha-ho ("Limited Liability
Corporations Act") (YK Act). 69 In contrast with the KK, YK equity
interests are technically mochibun70 (which will be translated as
"membership interests" for the purposes of this Article71 ), and holders
72
of these interests are referred to as "members" (sha'in).
The YK was
modeled primarily on the German GmbH due to the GmbH's success

and influence and because Japan's commercial law was based on
Germany's; however, other foreign influences were also taken into

account.73 Despite both its greater suitability for small businesses as
a matter of design 74 and its strong growth over the decades,75 the YK

64.
Sh6-ho [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899. The Sho-ho itself is still partly
in force, but provisions applicable to KKs and other corporate entities (gomei kaisha and
goshi kaisha) have been repealed and replaced by the Kaisha-h6. Unless otherwise
specified, all references to Sho-ho provisions are as of the date of repeal.
65.
Takahashi Eiji, Nihon ni okeru Heisa-teki Shihon Kaisha no Hatten to Ho
[The Development and the Law of Closed-type Companiesof Capital], 1914 SHOJI HOMU
4, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Takahashi, Closed-type Companies].
66.
Id.
67.
The semi-official dictionary adopted by the Japanese Government also notes
that it is permissible to translate kabu as "stock" "depending on context". Kabu,
JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION COUNCIL, STANDARD LEGAL TERMS DICTIONARY 53 (Mar.
2019 ed.). However, given that "shares" tends to be the more commonly used variant in
English-language writing on Japanese corporate law, this Article will use "shares" while
acknowledging the linguistic tension between "stock corporation" and "shares".
68.
In similar vein, "stockholder" is also permissible "depending on context." Id.
at 54.
69.
Yugen Kaisha-h6 [Limited Liability Corporations Act], Law No. 74 of 1938,
repealed by Law No. 87 of 2005 (Japan) [hereinafter YK Act].
70.
Id. at arts. 18-19 (repealed).
71.
This is for the purpose of distinguishing the YK from the KK.
72.
YK Act arts. 18-19ff.
73.
SAKAMAKI TOSHIO, HEISA-TEKI KAISHA NO HORI TO RIPPO [CLOSE
CORPORATIONS: DOCTRINE AND LEGISLATION] 238-39 (Nipponhy6ronsha 1973)
(explaining why the legislature also took into consideration the laws of England, France,
and Austria).
74.
SUZUKI TAKEO, SHIN-PAN KAISHA HO [CORPORATE LAw: NEW EDITION] 361,

363 n.1 (5th rev. ed., Kobundo 1994).
75.
See TAKAHASHI EIJI, J0ZOKU KAISHA NI OKERU SHOS

KABU'NUSHI NO HOGO
[PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN DEPENDENT SUBSIDIARIES] 215 (Yuhikaku
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did not achieve dominance over the KK during its lifetime for reasons
76
and the YK's
including the YK Act's poor drafting and structure
77
negative signaling among business people.

Together with other reasons, 78 these problems led to the repeal of
the YK Act 79 in conjunction with the enactment of the Kaisha-ho.
Since then, no new YKs can be incorporated; all YKs existing as of the
Kaisha-h6's entry into force are formally and involuntarily converted
into KKs with special transitionary governing provisions. 80

Accordingly, YKs today are technically "stock corporations" with
"shares." A significant number of ex-YKs still remain and, as of 2017,
8
number about 1.57 million. 1

1998); Harald Baum & Gen Goto, Die japanischeLLP im gesellschaftsrechtlichen Kontext
[The J-LLP in the Corporate Law Context], 41 J. JAPANESE L. 89, 97 tbl.1 (2016)
(providing data); Michiyo Hamada, Forthcoming Legislative Reform of Japanese
CorporationLaw: ComparativeStudy of Japanese and American Close CorporationLaw
4 fig.2 (1986) (unpublished research paper, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Hamada,
ForthcomingLegislative Reform].
See SAKAMAKI, supra note 73, at 240 (describing the YK Act's heavy use of
76.
cross-references to the Commercial Code).
See Kitazawa Masahiro & Hamada Michiyo, Sho-Kibo Kabushiki Kaisha
77.
oyobi Yugen Kaisha ni kansuru Jittai, Iken Chosa: Chakan Hokoku [Surveys on the
Realities and Opinions Concerning Small-Scale KKs and YKs: Interim Report], 962
SHOJI HOMU 21, 30 tbl.13, 31 tbl.14 (1983); Takahashi, Closed-type Companies, supra
note 65, at 5.
78.
See Aizawa Tetsu & Kbriya Daisuke, Kaisha Hosei no Gendaika ni Tomonau
Jisshitsu Kaisei no Gaiyo to Kihon-teki na Kangaekata [The Outline and Fundamental
Philosophy of the Substantive Reforms in Connection with the Modernization of the
Corporate Law System], in RITSUAN TANTOSHA NI YORU SHIN-KAISHA HO NO KAISETSU
[THE DRAFTSMEN'S COMMENTARY ON THE NEW COMPANIES ACT] 1, 9 (Aizawa Tetsu ed.,

Bessatsu Shoji Homu No. 295, Shojihomu 2006) (stating that the merger of the KK and
the YK was a response to, among other things, the erosion of the conceptual distinction
between the two forms in business practice, and the discordance between how the two
forms regulate various aspects [such as the number and term limits of directors and
whether features such as a board of directors (torishimariyaku-kai) or one or more
statutory auditors (kansayaku) are mandatory]).
Takahashi, Closed-type Companies, supra note 65, at 6.
79.
Technically, the conversion of YKs into KKs is not provided for in the Kaisha80.
ho itself, but a companion act that, among other things, also repealed the YK Act and
other companies legislation that accumulated over the decades. The conversion is made
pursuant to Kaisha Ho no Shikb ni tomonau Kanren Horitsu no Seibi-to ni kansuru
Horitsu [Act on Arrangement of Relevant Acts Incidental to Enforcement of the
Companies Act], Law No. 87 of 2005, art. 2 (Japan) [hereinafter Seibi-ho]; see also
Yamamoto Norimitsu, Yagen Kaisha Ho no Haishi ni tomonau Keika Sochi
[TransitionaryArrangements Accompanying the Repeal of the YK Act], in RITSUAN
TANTOSHA NI YORU SHIN-KAISHA HO NO KAISETSU [THE DRAFISMEN'S COMMENTARY ON
THE NEW COMPANIES ACT] 229, 230-38 (Aizawa Tetsu ed., Bessatsu Shoji Homu No. 295,
Shojihomu 2006) (describing the changes); Eiji Takahashi & Madoka Shimizu, The
Future of Japanese Corporate Governance: The 2005 Reform, 19 J. JAPANESE L. 35, 41,
45-46 (2005) (discussing changes to the KK).
81.

Compare KANDA HIDEKI, KAISHA-HO [CORPORATE LAW]

7 n.1 (20th ed.

Ynhikaku 2018) (1.573 million as of October 2017) with Baum & Goto, supra note 75, at
97 tbl.1 (1.64 million as of 2014).
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For ease of exposition and unless the context otherwise specifies
that only the KK is discussed, in the rest of this Article,
"shareholder(s)" is used more broadly to refer to both KK shareholders
and YK members (especially in Part II) as well as holders of equity
interests in corporation forms more generally (particularly Parts II and
VI).
B. Exit Without Withdrawal: The Exceptionalism of Japanese Close
CorporationLaw
The central claim advanced here in Part III is that withdrawal
is completely absent from Japan's two widely adopted 82 close

corporation forms. As this renders the world's erstwhile second-largest
economy an outlier among other comparable leading economies, it

deserves scrutiny. This subpart demonstrates how, despite the
existence of various exit mechanisms seemingly applicable to Japanese
close corporations before 2005, withdrawal specifically was not

available.
To appreciate Japanese corporate law's exceptionalism, grasping
the distinction between withdrawal and exit is critical. As defined

above at Part II.B, withdrawal is "shareholder exit that occurs at the
election of the shareholder desirous of exit and creates a monetary
claim of the withdrawing shareholder for the value of their shares." 83
This Article is not making the claim that the KK and YK lacked any

form of exit. In fact, both close corporation forms offered, and the KK
continues to offer, under the Kaisha-ho, a variety of exit mechanisms
such as judicial dissolution, 84 appraisal (KK only), 85 as well as the
right to transfer equity to another person. This last exit mechanism of

voluntary transfer of KK shares/YK membership interests to another
person 86 -presumably in exchange for money or equivalent benefitsis fundamental to Japanese corporate law. In the context of KKs with
share transfer restrictions (and historically, for YKs as well), however,

this is further subject to a relatively complex system of rules. Although

82.
See infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the relative popularity
of YKs and KKs compared to other business entities in Japan).
83.
See supraPart I.B, at 16.
84.
See Sho-ho, [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 406-2 (Japan)
(repealed) (providing for a shareholders' right to apply to a court for dissolution of a
company); YK Act, art. 71-2 (repealed) (same); Kaisha-ho, [Companies Act], Law No. 86
of 2005, art. 833(1) (Japan) (same).
85.
See generally Moritz Balz, AppraisalRights in Japanese CorporateLaw, 13 J.
JAPANESE L. 152 (2002); Alan K. Koh, Appraising Japan'sAppraisal Remedy, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 417 (2014).
86.
Sho-ho, art. 204(1) (repealed); YK Act, art. 19(1) (repealed) (providing for
transfer to other members of the YK); Kaisha-ho, art. 127.
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not well known in the English-language literature, 87 these rules are,
88
with minor modifications, still good law for KKs under the Kaisha-h
(including ex-YKs 89). The analysis to follow will show how this
restricted-transfer equity regime-which has few parallels in the

corporate laws of other leading economies 9 0 -is not a "withdrawal"
91
mechanism within the meaning of this Article.

As a matter of corporate law, 92 transfer of shares (as well as the
rights and status of a shareholder) as a means of shareholder exit is
legally straightforward when the corporation is a KK with no share
transfer restrictions. However, in KKs that wish to preserve their

"close" character using a legal mechanism, 93 shares may be subject to
joto-seigen
shares"
("restricted-transfer
restrictions
transfer
94
kabushiki) via provision in the corporation's constitution (teikan).
Although a transfer of shares is binding as between transferor and
95
in the
transferee without the need for approval by an external party,

87.
For an alternative description of this regime under the Kaisha-h, see, e.g.,
IcHIRO KAWAMOTO, YASUHIRO KAWAGUCHI & TAKAYUKI KIHIRA, CORPORATIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS IN JAPAN 153-55 (Wolters Kluwer 2012); HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW
239 (3d ed., Oxford University Press 2009).
Kaisha-ho, arts. 136-45 (establishing rules governing when and how a
88.
shareholder may transfer their shares).
Seibi-ho, art. 9.
89.
The sole exception that the author knows of is the Republic of Korea. See
90.
Sangbeop [Commercial Act], Act No. 1000, Jan. 20, 1962, amended by Act No. 15755,
Sept. 18, 2018, arts. 335 to 335-7 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research
Institute
online
database,
(last visited
https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng service/lawView.do?lang-ENG&hseq=51179
Aug. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BJW7-8EU4] (archived Aug. 19, 2020). Due to its
potentially sensitive nature, as an outsider, the author shall not comment on the
connection, if any, between these two corporate law regimes.
The discussion of restricted-transfer shares in this Subpart is the author's
91.
response to feedback from Professor Goto Gen and Professor Shishido Zen'ichi on earlier
versions of this Article.
In line with this Article's focus on close corporations, the Article does not
92.
discuss the securities law aspects.
EGASHIRA KENJIRO, KABUSHIKI KAISHA HO [THE LAWS OF STOCK
93.
CORPORATIONS] 233 (7th ed., Ynhikaku 2017) [hereinafter EGASHIRA 2017] (observing
that there is a strong demand in closed-type (heisa-gata) corporations to keep the
shareholder body limited to persons who are in a relationship of interpersonal trust).
Interestingly, when restricted-transfer shares were re-introduced by law reform in 1966,
one of the motivations may have been to prevent takeovers of KKs by foreign capital. Id.
at 234 n.3.
Sho-ho, [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 204(1) proviso (Japan)
94.
(repealed); Kaisha-ho, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2(xvii) (Japan) (defining
joto seigen kabushiki); id. at arts. 107(2)(i), 108(2)(iv) (requiring that a transfer
restriction must be specified in the constitution).
Imai Hiroshi, § 204 / 2 [§ 204-2], in III SHIN-PAN CHfiSHAKU KAISHA HO:
95.
KABUSHIKI (1) [CORPORATE LAW COMMENTARY, NEW EDITION: SHARES (1)] 79, 83-84

(Ueyanagi Katsuro, Otori Tsuneo & Takeuchi Akio eds., Ynhikaku 1986) (noting that a
transfer of shares pursuant to a contract for the sale and purchase of shares is effective
as between the parties); KANDA, supra note 81, at 112 (stating that a transfer is effective
between the parties with "manifestation of intention" (ishi hylji)).

2020]

SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN JAPAN'S CLOSE CORPS

1225

case of restricted-transfer shares a transfer does not bind the KK or
other third parties unless such transfer is approved by the
corporation. 96 Both the transferor and the transferee have the right to
request the KK to approve the transfer. 97 Approval may either be
expressly granted by resolution of the proper organ of the KK,98 or
deemed to have been implicitly given if approval is not communicated
by the proper organ within a specified timeframe. 99 For YKs, transfer
of membership interest from one existing YK member to another YK
member required no further approval to be binding on the YK.1 00
Transfer to a third party (i.e., to a non-YK member), however, was
subject to similar rules as those for KK restricted-transfer shares. 101

What happens if the corporation refuses to grant approval? The
distinctive feature of Japan's legal framework for KK restricted-

transfer shares and YK membership interests is how it accommodated
under the Sho-ho, and continues to accommodate for KKs under the
Kaisha-ho, two competing aims: maintaining the "close" aspect of a
close corporation and protecting the interest of a shareholder or
member in recovering their investment. 102 The corporation has the
power to refuse approval of the transfer,1 03 but the transferor and
transferee have alternative recourse in the right to demand that the
corporation designate (shitei-su / shitei-suru) an alternative purchaser

for the shares ("designated purchaser" sono kabushiki [YK: mochibun]
wo kaiuku beki mono I shitei kaitori-nin),which may be the corporation

96.
Kaisha-h5, arts. 130(1), 133(1), 134(i), (ii); Imai, supra note 95, at 83.
97.
Sh5-h5, arts. 204-2(1) (transferor), 204-5(1) (transferee) (all repealed);
Kaisha-h5, arts. 136, 137(1) (applying to transferors and transferees, respectively).
98.
Kaisha-hd, art. 139(1) (depending on the specific subtype of KK, a resolution
of either the shareholder meeting [kabunushi sokai] or board of directors
[torishimariyaku-kai]);Ueyanagi Katsur5, § 204, in III SHIN-PAN CHISHAKU KAISHA HO:
KABUSHIKI (1) [CORPORATE LAW COMMENTARY, NEW EDITION: SHARES (1)] 53, 64-65

(Ueyanagi Katsuro, Otori Tsuneo & Takeuchi Akio eds., Ynhikaku 1986) (stating that,
in the context of the Sho-h5 era, according to majority scholarly opinion, only the board
may be vested with the power to approve a transfer).
99.
Approval is deemed to be given if the proper organ fails to communicate
refusal within a specified time period. Sho-hb, art. 204-2(7) (repealed); Kaisha-h5, art.
145.
100. YK Act, art. 19(1) (repealed).
101. Id. art. 19(2) (transfer to non-members required approval of the members'
meeting); id. 19(3) (transferor had right to request approval of transfer); id. 19(7)
(transferee had right to request approval of transfer); id. 19(3)-(7) (applying various Sh5hb provisions on restricted-transfer shares mutatis mutandis) (all repealed).

102. See Ueyanagi, supra note 98, at 58-59, 60, 66 (describing the legislative policy
behind the 1966 reform introducing the restricted-transfer share regime).
103. Albeit not an unfettered power. See, e.g., EGASHIRA KENJIRO, KABUSHIKI
KAISHA HO, YPGEN KAISHA HO [LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS AND LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANIES] 214 n.7 (4th ed. Yuhikaku 2005) [hereinafter EGAsHIRA 2005] (summarizing
constraints).
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itself.1 04 Under the Sho-ho and YKAct, the designated purchaser also
had the right to demand that the original shareholder (transferor)
transfer to the designated purchaser the shares/membership interest
at issue. 105 Under the Kaisha-ho, the corporation or other designated
purchaser is required to give a statutorily prescribed notice to the

transferor-an act that also creates a sale and purchase contract for
06
the shares binding on the transferor and the designated purchaser.1

The purchase price for the shares is, in principle, up to the parties (the
transferor and the designated purchaser) to negotiate between
themselves.1 07 However, either party may within twenty days of the

date of the demand to transfer (Sho-ho) or the date of the statutorily
prescribed notice (Kaisha-h6) apply to court for a judicial
determination of the purchase price.1 08
The regime governing KK restricted-transfer shares and YK
membership interests described above offers close corporation
shareholders a form of "exit," but not "withdrawal." Properly
understood, the KK/YK transfer restriction system is premised on the

existence of a willing purchaser for the shares in the first place; if there
is no prospective transferee to begin with, the rules did not (and, under
current KK law, do not) provide an exit mechanism. All the rules do is

to create a statutory right of a shareholder/member to force the
corporation to make a choice between approving a private transaction

and purchasing (or arranging someone else to purchase) the shares,
and provide them with a mechanism for disputes over valuation of (but

not liability to purchase) the shares. The system does not assist a
shareholder who is for any reason-including illegal, oppressive, or

otherwise unfair acts of other participants in the corporation, or any
other circumstances of the corporation-unable to find a person willing

to purchase their shares at an acceptable price. In other words, the
KK/YK system is not a solution to the close corporation problem.

104. Sh6-h6, arts. 204-2(1) (transferor), 204-5(1) (transferee), 204-3-2(1) (the KK's
board may designate the KK itself as the purchaser) (all repealed); YK Act, arts. 19(3)
(transferor), 19(7) (transferee), 19(6) (members' meeting may designate the YK as the
purchaser) (all repealed); Kaisha-h6, arts. 136 (transferor), 137(1) (transferee), 140(1)
(as a starting point, the KK itself should (and may) purchase the shares), 140(4) (the KK
may, as an alternative, specify another person as the designated purchaser). When the
corporation is the designated purchaser (effectively creating a share buyback scenario),
difficult issues of capital maintenance arise (Kaisha-ho); in the interests of brevity, the
Article does not discuss them here.
105. Sh6-h6, arts. 204-3(1), 204-5(1) (applying articles 204-3, 204-3-2, and 204-4
mutatis mutandis) (all repealed); YK Act, art. 19(5) (applying article 204-3(1) of the Sh6h6 mutatis mutandis) (repealed).
106. See Kaisha-ho, arts. 141, 142 (requiring the purchaser in a stock transfer to
give notice of purchase); EGASHIRA 2017, supra note 93, at 242.
107. See Sho-ho, art. 204-4(1) (repealed); YK Act, art. 19(5).(applying article 204-4
of the Sh6-h6 mutatis mutandis) (repealed); Kaisha-h6, art. 144(1), (7) (applying article
144(1) mutatis mutandis); EGASHIRA 2005, supra note 103, at 216.
108. Sho-ho, art. 204-4(3) (repealed); YK Act, art. 19(5) (repealed); Kaisha-h6, arts.
144(2), (7) (applying article 144(2) mutatis mutandis).

2020]

SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INJAPAN'S CLOSE CORPS

1227

Conversely, withdrawal does not require a willing purchaser to
exist; the very essence of withdrawal is the creation of a monetary
claim by the shareholder against some person, who may (although not
necessarily) be made liable to pay the withdrawing shareholder by
force of corporate law rather than via consent. In requiring neither a

market for shares nor the mercy of the (potentially oppressive)
majority, withdrawal is a solution to the close corporation problem that
a minority shareholder may resort to without depending on any actor
but corporate law and the legal system. Accordingly, the KK/YK
transfer restriction system is not withdrawal in any form. Rather, it is,

at best, analogizable to a statutory right of first refusal to the
corporation (or a person as designated by the corporation) with a courtadministered valuation mechanism.

D. The Puzzle: Does Withdrawal's HistoricalAbsence from
Japan'sClose CorporationsUndermine the Case for
Withdrawal?
By all appearances, pre-Kaisha-hoJapanese corporate law seems
to be the outlier among leading nations on legal withdrawal for close
corporations. For better or for worse, the Japanese generally do not
make adequate ex ante contractual arrangements with a view to
forestalling or resolving possible future close corporation disputes.1 0 9
Yet, despite withdrawal's absence in both the KK and the YK, whether
in corporate law or widely adopted contractual practice, Japan has
become one of the world's leading economies. 1 10 A puzzle thus presents
itself: is Japan the glaring exception proving that withdrawal remedies
are not essential to close corporation law in general (i.e., contrary to
what Part II.B"'l has advanced above)?
To solve this puzzle, Part III.C makes three points. First, it shows

that there was popular demand for withdrawal; unmet by the deficient
formal legal regime, this demand was addressed by creative, functional
substitutes, albeit only partly and imperfectly. Second, it also provides

109. Ueyanagi Katsur6 et al., SHIMPOJIUMU: Shokibo, Heisa Kaisha no Rippo
[Symposium: Legislatingfor Small- and Closed Corporations],46 SHIHO 117, 140 (1984)
(Statement by Hamada Michiyo). However, share transfer restrictions were adopted
almost universally (>90%) in KKs incorporated since 1975. Kitazawa & Hamada, supra
note 77, at 30 tbl.12. Express share transfer restrictions were unnecessary in the YK;
any transfer of membership interests to persons other than existing YK members

required approval of the members in general meeting. YK Act, art. 19(2) (repealed).
Transfers between members did not require approval. Id. art. 19(1) (repealed).
110. As of 2019, Japan was the third largest economy in the world by gross
domestic product after only the US and the People's Republic of China. Gross domestic
product
2019,
WORLD
BANK
(July
1,
2020),
https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T4T-GG9V]
(archived Aug. 19, 2020).
111. See supra Part II.B (emphasizing the necessity of withdrawal remedies).
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a concise account of a serious, though abortive, attempt to introduce a
formal withdrawal regime through law reform that nonetheless

revealed a scholarly consensus over the necessity of withdrawal as a
legal regime. Finally, it explains why Japanese businesses-despite
the deficiency of KKs and YKs with respect to legal withdrawal
solutions-nonetheless adopted these forms in droves for other

business reasons. These three points, which arose out of Japan's
unique circumstances, demonstrate withdrawal's practical relevance,

despite its absence from Japan's corporate law.
1.

Partial, Functional Substitutes for a Formal Withdrawal Regime

Without any specific statutory provision entitling them to relief
by withdrawal, aggrieved shareholders-and their lawyers-had to get
creative. Shareholders would resort to threatening the company and
its controlling shareholders with disclosure of illegal activities, such as

tax evasion. 112 While presumably effective, this nonetheless amounts
to borderline or actual extortion. Attorneys representing aggrieved

minority shareholders often adopted the more legalistic approach of
lawsuits challenging corporate procedures for noncompliance with
necessary legal formalities. 113 Examples include seeking invalidation

of a shareholder resolution or a declaration of the nonexistence
11 5
Other
thereof1" 4 or a declaration of nullity of a board resolution.
techniques involve combinations of legal mechanisms. For example, a

challenge to the validity of a shareholder resolution appointing a

112. Hamada Michiyo, Kabunushi no Mujoken Kabushiki Kaitori Seikyu-ken (ichi)
[The Shareholder'sRight to Demand a Share Buyout at Will (Part1)], 982 SHOJI HOMU
59, 63 (1983) [hereinafter Hamada, Shareholder'sRight].
113. See generally Harald Baum & Eiji Takahashi, Klagen gegen fehlerhafte
Hauptversammlungsbeschlusseim japanischen Aktienrecht [Legal Challenges against
Flawed ShareholderMeeting Resolutions in JapaneseKK Law], 32 J. JAPANESE L. 153
(2011). European jurisdictions also offer similar avenues for shareholder challenges,
although not the UK. BACHMANN, EIDENMOLLER, ENGERT, FLEISCHER & SCHON, supra

note 19, at 63-64.
114. Sh-ho, [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, arts. 247(1)(i), 252 (Japan)
(repealed) (applying to the KK); YK Act, art 41 (repealed) (applying to the YK); Kaishaho, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005 arts. 830-31 (Japan) (applying to the KK). No
statutory equivalent exists for the GK because there is no mandatory requirement that
the members, each and every one of whom have executive powers by default (Kaisha-ho,
art. 590(1)), to pass formal "resolutions" (ketsugi) at a "meeting" (sokai). By default,
decisions on day-to-day business (jomu) may be taken by members individually unless
objected to by another member (Kaisha-ho, art 590(3)), and by simple majority in the
case of ordinary business decisions with member objections and management decisions
(gyomu) (Kaisha-ho, art. 590(2)). See generally Shishido Zen'ichi, Dai-590-j0 [Article 590],
in 14 KAISHA HO KONMENTARU: MOCHIBUN KAISHA (1) [COMMENTARY ON THE
COMPANIES ACT: MEMBERSHIP COMPANIES (1)] 133, 134-35 (Kanda Hideki ed.,
Shbjihomu 2014); see also EGASHIRA 2017, supranote 93, at 366 n.1.

115. See Saikb Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 8, 1972, 26(9) Minshn 1489; EGASHIRA
2005, supra note 103, at 359, 360 n.16; EGASHIRA 2017, supra note 93, at 425.
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director 116 (or an application to remove a director for cause11 ) could
be combined with an application for provisional court orders (karishobun; similar to interim injunctions) that would suspend the director
in question and appoint in their place an acting director.11 8

These lawsuits in and of themselves did nothing to resolve the
underlying issues in dispute,11 9 even if the aggrieved shareholder won
the lawsuit itself.1 20 If the aggrieved shareholder's complaint was, on

its face, that a shareholder resolution was not passed at a properly
convened

shareholder

meeting,

all

the

controlling

majority

shareholders needed to do was to convene a meeting properly and pass
the resolution correctly next time. Why, then, did attorneys commence
such lawsuits when their clients hardly cared about corporate law
formalities? 12 1 Because these lawsuits worked, if indirectly. First,

given that noncompliance with corporate formalities in small, closely
held corporations was an endemic problem,1 2 2 it was easy to find some
basis to commence such lawsuits, and even win. 12 3 Second, neither the

116. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanisms of
challenges to resolutions).
117. Shbh6, arts. 257(3), 257-3(4) (repealed) (KK); YK Act, art. 31-3 (repealed);
Kaisha-ho, arts. 854, 860 (applying to the removal of directors and other KK officers and
termination of executive members' rights to manage or represent the company in GKs
and other membership companies, respectively).
118. Hamada, Shareholder's Right, supra note 112, at 63 (citing Commercial Code
articles 270 and 271 as the basis). Article 270 was subsequently repealed in 1990; the
current equivalent is Minji Hozen-h6 [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of
1989, art. 23(2) (Japan). Article 271 was also repealed; today's equivalents are Kaishaho, arts. 352 (pertaining to KKs), 603 (applying to membership companies including
GKs) read with Minji Hozen-ho, art. 56.
119. See Shishido Zen'ichi, Heisa Kaisha ni Okeru Naibu FunsJ no Kaiketsu to
Keizai-teki Kosei [Ways to Achieve FinancialFairnessin Coping with InternalDissension
in the Closely-Held Corporation],46 SHIHO 237, 237 (1984) [hereinafter Shishido, Ways
to Achieve].
120. See Shishido Zen'ichi, Problems of the Closely Held Corporation: A
Comparative Study of the Japanese and American Legal Systems and a Critique of the
Japanese Tentative Draft on Close Corporations, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 337, 341-44 (1990)
[hereinafter Shishido, Problems] (explaining how the Japanese legal process does not
directly assist even a successful shareholder plaintiff in achieving their desired outcome);
Hamada, Shareholder'sRight, supra note 112, at 63.
121. Hamada, Shareholder'sRight, supra note 112, at 63. (observing that minority
shareholders had little awareness that non-compliance with corporate formalities is
unlawful, and that clients were often surprised when their attorneys suggested bringing
procedural challenges as a means of resolving shareholder disputes).
122. Id.; see also AOTAKE SHOICHI, SHO-KIBO HEISA KAISHA NO HOKISEI [LEGAL
REGULATION OF SMALL-SCALE CLOSED CORPORATIONS], 318-19 (Bunshindo 1979)

(observing that many small-scale KKs have neither the inclination nor ability to comply
with the law governing KKs); Ueyanagi et al., supra note 109, at 119 (Statement by
Imanaka Toshiaki) (a legal practitioner observing that Japan lacked a spirit of legal
compliance); Hamada, ForthcomingLegislative Reform, supra note 75, at 15.
123. Shishido Zen'ichi, Heisa Kaisha ni okeru Naibu Funso no Kaiketsu to Keizaiteki Kosei (ichi) [Ways to Achieve FinancialFairnessin Coping with InternalDissensions
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attorneys nor the shareholders needed or even necessarily wanted to

succeed in these lawsuits per se. 124 Instead, it was the shockespecially to a small company-caused by the commencement of legal
proceedings that brought the relevant parties to the negotiating
table. 125 Ultimately, the dispute would almost invariably be resolved
with the factual withdrawal of one of the parties in conflict via
settlement that is facilitated, with great effort, by the parties'
12 6
attorneys and even the judges hearing the lawsuits.
That this phenomenon went largely unnoticed by foreign
127
Without adequate knowledge of Japan's
observers is unsurprising.

somewhat peculiar context, even careful analysis of the reported cases
on actions challenging corporate procedures would have yielded little
insight. Constrained by doctrine as to the scope of the facts and issues
that could be addressed, in cases where only peripheral issues could be
litigated, Japanese court judgments could have said little to shed light
on the real, underlying core issues. 128 Within Japan's legal
community, however, the practice of using lawsuits over corporate
legal formalities for the purpose of resolving shareholder disputes as

described above appeared to be established and well known. Not only
were astute academic commentators such as Hamada Michiyo 129
familiar with it, even the Ministry of Justice's law reform officers
practice's existence.13 0

expressly acknowledged the
Even though the practical workarounds arguably achieved a
measure of success by prompting settlement with factual withdrawal
as the result in many cases, they were not without their shortcomings.
For example, cooperation from understanding judges was key. Yet not
all judges were sufficiently aware, as a string of Japanese judgments

featured dismissals, on grounds of abuse, of shareholder applications

in the Closely Held Corporation(Part 1)], 101 HOGAKU KYOKAI ZAsSHI 505, 541 (1984)
(reporting that shareholder plaintiffs won in a majority of over 100 reported decisions
from 1950 to 1982 on shareholder challenges to shareholder resolutions).
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. See Hamada, Shareholder's Right, supra note 112, at 63.
126. See id. at 63-64; Ueyanagi et al, supra note 109, at 129, 141 (Statement by
Hamada Michiyo).
127. The sole published English-language source discussing this appears to be
Shishido, Problems, supra note 120, at 342-44 (describing how such lawsuits operate
within Japan's civil litigation context). Hamada's 1986 Harvard Law School paper
(Hamada, supra note 75) is, while insightful and powerfully written, unfortunately
unpublished.
128. Shishido, Ways to Achieve, supra note 119, at 237-38; Shishido, Problems,
supra note 120, at 341-44.
129. Hamada, Shareholder'sRight, supra note 112, at 63.
130. INABA TAKEO & OTANI YOSHIO, SHOHO, YUGEN-KAISHA-HO KAISEI SHI'AN NO
KAISETSU [COMMENTARY ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE AND LIMITED LIABILITY
CORPORATION ACT REFORM PROPOSAL] 64 (Bessatsu Shoji Homu No. 89, Shbjihbmu
Kenkyn-kai 1986).
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challenging corporate formalities. 131 The second shortcoming is that
compelling aggrieved shareholders and their attorneys to bring
lawsuits unrelated to the underlying dispute imposed unnecessary
burdens on, 132 and arguably brought disrepute to, Japan's justice

system. By the 1980s, a consensus had emerged: the law had to be
reformed.
2.

Reform Attempt of the 1980s

The need for some form of withdrawal remedy was identified
at least as early as 1951 (for KKs).133 As the problems of close
corporations came to be better understood over the 1970s, many

Japanese academics came to the view that reform was necessary.1 34
The emerging consensus culminated in one serious attempt at
introducing a withdrawal regime for the KK and the YK via legislation,
which took place as part of a comprehensive reform primarily of KK
law. Consultations in 1984135 culminated in the 1986 Commercial
Code and Limited Liability Corporation Act Reform Proposal ("1986

131. See cases cited in EGASHIRA 2005, supra note 103, at 323 n.1. They have not
escaped criticism by academics more sympathetic to the plight of these shareholders,
including Egashira himself, who criticized the courts for being excessively moralistic. Id.
132. See Hamada, ForthcomingLegislativeReform, supranote 75, at 16 (reporting
that overburdened judges have called for reform).

133. Komachiya Sozo, Kaisei Kabushiki Kaisha Ho Kanken [Submissions on the
Reforms to the Law on the KK, 15 TOHOKU H6GAKU 369, 404 (1951) (proposing a
withdrawal remedy as a replacement for the then-newly introduced shareholder right to
apply for judicial dissolution).
134. Among the earliest to take up the cause of reform is Hamada Michiyo, who
began advocating for a withdrawal right at will based on her research on the law of close
corporations in the United States in a 1974 book. See HAMADA MICHIYO, AMERIKA
Heisa Kaisha Ho: Sono Genjo oyobi Nihon Ho e no Teigen [AMERICAN CLOSE
CORPORATION LAW: ITS CURRENT STATE AND ITS SUGGESTIONS FOR JAPANESE LAW] 340-

45 (Shbjihbmu Kenkyu-kai 1974). Other scholarly "converts" included Takeuchi Akio, a
leading University of Tokyo corporate law scholar. Yazawa Makoto et al., Shoho Bukai
SHIMPOJIUMU: Kaisha Ho no Konpon Kaisei [Corporate Law Subcommittee
Symposium: Fundamental Reform of Corporate Law], 39 SHIHO 95, 119-120 (1977)
(Statement by Takeuchi Akio); see also Mori Junjiro, Heisa-kaishani okeru Shihai no Iji
to Toka-shihon no Kaishu [Maintenance of Control and Recovery of Invested Capital in
Closed Corporations],56(11) HORITSU JIHO 23, 25-27 (1984).
135. For the original consultation document, see HOMU-SHO MINJI-KYOKU
SANJIKAN-SHITSU

[COUNSELLoRS'

OFFICE,

CIVIL AFFAIRS BUREAU,

MINISTRY

OF

JUSTICE], Taisho (Kokai, Hi-Kokai) Kaisha Kubun Rippo oyobi Gappei ni kansuru
Mondaiten-Showa 59-nen 5-gatsu 9-nichi (Shiryo) [Issues on Legislating Separately for
Companies Based on Size Distinctions (Open, Closed) and Mergers-9 May 1984
(Materials)], in TAISHO KAISHA KUBUN RIPPO-TO NO RONTEN-H6MUSHO NO
"MONDAITEN" NO KAISETSU TO BUNKEN KAIDAI [ISSUES ON LEGISLATING SEPARATELY
FOR COMPANIES BASED ON SIZE DISTINCTIONS, ETC.-COMMENTARY ON THE MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE'S "ISSUES" AND LITERATURE REVIEW] 190-208 (Inaba Takeo et al. eds., Bessatsu

Shoji Hbmu No. 75, Shbjihbmu Kenkyu-kai 1984).
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6
Reform Proposal") by the Ministry of Justice.13 Clause 3-8-a of the

1986 Reform Proposal provides:
In stock corporations [KKs] without marketable share certificates and limited
liability corporations [YKs], if the interests of a part of the shareholders or
members are dealt with in a significantly unfair manner, the affected
shareholders or members shall have a claim as against the corporation for the
13 7
designation of a purchaser for their shares or membership interests.

Under the proposed regime, the corporation may purchase its own
shares but only up to the limit that may be distributed as dividends
(Clause 3-8-c). If the person designated as purchaser fails to perform
their obligation, or the corporation fails to make a designation within
a specified time frame (such as three weeks), the representative
director or directors1 38 would be deemed the designated purchaser or
purchasers with joint and severable liability respectively (Clause 3-8d and explanatory note).1 39

Amidst incessant debate over the 1986 Reform Proposal's lack of
clarity on important issues,140 the only attempt at introducing a

withdrawal mechanism ended in failure,1 4 ' possibly due to concerns

136.

For the full text of the Reform Proposal, see HOMU-SHO MINJI-KYOKU

SANJIKAN-sHITSU [COUNSELORS' OFFICE, CIVIL AFFAIRS BUREAU, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE],

Shoho, yagen-gaisha-ho kaisei shi'an (Showa 61-nen 5-gatsu 15-nichi) [Commercial Code
and Limited Liability Corporation Act Reform Proposal (15.05.1986)], in INABA & OTANI,
supra note 130, at 125-42.
137.

INABA & OTANI, supra note 130, at 58.

138. Under Japanese corporate law not all directors ipso facto have the power to
"represent"(daihy6) the corporation, i.e., to act as its legal agent with power to bind the
corporation. Directors so empowered are called "representative directors" and are
functionally equivalent to managing directors, presidents, or CEOs in other jurisdictions.
See generally Kaisha-h5, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 349 (Japan) (stating
the powers of representatives of KKs).
139. INABA & OTANI, supra note 130, at 58.
140. Hamada observed that the 1986 Reform Proposal did not clearly state which
corporate organ, the board of directors or the shareholder meeting, should appoint the
designated purchaser, and observed that the issue would be more complex where the
corporation itself is the designated purchaser. See Hamada Michiyo, Kabushiki,
Mochibun no Kaitori Seikyz-ken: Kaisha-ho Kaisei Shi'an ni okeru sono Koso ni tsuite
[The Right to Demand Repurchase of Shares and Membership Interests: On their
Conception in the Corporate Law Reform Proposal], 1093 SHOJI HOMU 2, 7 (1986)
[hereinafter Hamada, Right to Demand].

141. Toward the end of 1989, the Commercial Law Subcommittee (Shoho-bukai)
determined that it would be too difficult to resolve all the issues covered by the extensive
1986 Reform Proposal together. Subsequently, the Legislative Council prepared a muchreduced reform outline in March 1990 that was later submitted, with few amendments,
as the reform bill by the government to the Diet in April 1990. The bill was passed
without amendment by both Houses in June 1990, but with the proposed withdrawal
reforms completely dropped. See Hamada Michiyo, Sho-kibo Kaisha ni kansuru Rippojo no Mondaiten [Issues in Legislating for Small-scale Corporations], in Shoho no Soten
I- Sosoku, Kaisha [CONTESTED ISSUES IN COMMERCIAL LAW I: GENERAL PART,
CORPORATIONS] 30-31 (Kitazawa Masahiro & Hamada Michiyo eds., Yuhikaku 1993).
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over enforcement mechanisms. 142 Thus, notwithstanding academic
consensus on the salience of shareholder conflict,
legislature failed to act.143

the Japanese

3. Japanese Businesses Chose Close Corporation Forms Without
Withdrawal for a Variety of Strategic Reasons
The preceding discussion in Part II.B and Part III has established
that withdrawal is essential to the resolution of close corporation
disputes. Notably, neither the KK nor YK expressly offered this
solution; further, the functional substitutes for a formal system of
withdrawal were, at their best, partial and problematic. The mystery

deepens when we consider that there were other corporate forms
offering withdrawal such as the commercial partnership (gomei
kaisha) or limited partnership (goshi kaisha), 144 but which were
deeply unpopular by comparison.1 45 Thus the final piece of the puzzle:
Why then did the Japanese consistently choose to incorporate millions

of KKs and YKs?
The short answer is that there were compelling strategic reasons
to incorporate as KKs or YKs notwithstanding the absence of a legal
withdrawal regime. The first is limited liability. In contrast to the
commercial partnership and limited partnership, only KKs and YKs
then offered limited liability for all shareholders/members. 146 The

142.

Kawamoto made a very brief observation that the withdrawal reforms were

dropped over problems with the proposed enforcement mechanism, by which the
designated purchaser's failure to pay would result in dissolution of company. Kawamoto
Ichiro, Shoho, Yagen-kaisha-ho Kaisei ni tsuite no Kei'i [A Chronology of the Reform of
the Commercial Code and Limited Liability CorporationAct], 856 KIN'YO SHOJI HANREI
12, 14 (1990). Kawamoto was then a member of the Commercial Law Subcommittee
involved in refining the 1986 Reform Proposal into a workable legislative agenda.
A detailed analysis and criticism of the proposed enforcement mechanisms (or

lack thereof) for the proposed withdrawal remedy was offered by Hamada. Hamada,
Right to Demand, supra note 140, at 3-5. For another pointed critique, see Oga
Yoshimitsu, Hi-Kokai Kaisha ni okeru Shosa-ha Kabunushi, Sha'in no Yokuatsu kara
no Kyusai: Kabushiki, Mochibun no Kaitori Seiky Seido [Relief from Oppression of
Shareholders/Members in Non-Open Corporations: The Share/Membership Interest

Buyout Regime], 10 SHUDO HOGAKU 275 (1988).
143. Hamada Michiyo, Heisa-kaishani okeru Kabushiki Seido no Kaisei [Reform
of the Share System in Closed Corporations],963 JURISUTO 48, 53 (1990).
144. These entities will be discussed together with the new GK corporate form
below. See infra Part IV.A.2.
145. See Hamada, Forthcoming Legislative Reform, supra note 75, at 4 fig.2
(providing a graphical representation of data from the National Tax Agency on the
different types of corporate forms in Japan).

146. Pre-Kaisha-ho, companies were not permitted to become unlimited members
of commercial partnerships and limited partnerships. Sh-ho, [Commercial Code], Law
No. 48 of 1899, art. 55 (Japan) (repealed). In limited partnerships, limited members were
expressly prohibited from managing the company or acting as the company's
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choice for Japanese business people was either limited liability or
withdrawal. 147 Corporate forms with full limited liability were
consistently preferred, given that the two incorporated partnership

forms were greatly outnumbered by KKs as early as 1950 and by YKs
by 1955.148 For the vast majority of businesses in Japan's postwar era,
the only practical choice was between the KK and the YK.
Japanese commentators have offered other reasons for the
popularity of KKs and YKs. Tax advantages 1l4 likely played a major
role in the "corporatization" (hojin-nari) of businesses in the postwar
years, in which businesses previously run as sole proprietorships

incorporated en masse as close corporations, and almost invariably as
KKs or YKs.lso Another related advantage was the impression of size
and social credibility that trading as a KK conveyed.151
Hamada gave a more sophisticated account for the popularity of
the KK and YK: accounting standards. Surveys she conducted in 1982

revealed that the most common reason for incorporating as KK or YK"clearer accounting contributes to the optimization of corporate
management"1 52 -was cited by almost two-thirds of KK and over half
of YK respondents.1 53 The connection between KK/YK incorporation
and accounting lay in Japan's postwar corporate compliance
environment. As businesses began incorporating postwar as KKs or

YKs en masse for tax advantages, they became subject to more exacting
mandatory accounting requirements.1 54 These corporations came to

rely heavily on accounting professionals,1 55 with many companies

representative. Sh6-h6, art 156 (repealed). Accordingly, only unlimited members were
permitted to manage a commercial/limited partnership, and using a German-style
GmbH & Co. KG hybrid such as a YK & Co. limited partnership to provide de facto full
limited liability for all members including those representing and/or managing the
company would have been also out of the question.
147. For reasons set out at text accompanying supra note 109, it was highly
unlikely that businesspeople would have even considered the question framed as such.
148. Hamada, Forthcoming Legislative Reform, supra note 75, at 4 fig.2
(demonstrating this with National Tax Agency data).
149.

See HIROMITSU ISHI, THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM 171-82 (3d ed., Oxford

University Press 2001) (describing the Japanese tax system and the tax advantages it
affords to smaller incorporated firms).
150.

EGASHIRA 2005, supra note 103, at 4 n.7 (noting the role of tax accountants in

encouraging incorporations); Hamada, Forthcoming Legislative Reform, supra note 75,
at 6 (pointing out that the KK's overwhelming popularity astonished observers).
151. Hamada, Forthcoming Legislative Reform, supra note 75, at 6 (summarizing
earlier literature and survey findings).
152. Cf. id. at 8 tbl.2 (translating as "better accounting techniques are employed
and it promotes the rationalization of our management"). The study discussed by
Hamada here is the same as that cited in this Article at infra note 153.
153. Kitazawa & Hamada, supra note 77, at 30 tbl.13 (reporting that 64.3% of KK
respondents and 52.5% of YK respondents cited this reason). The second most popular
reason was "increased credibility when dealing with trading partners". Id.
154. Hamada, Forthcoming Legislative Reform, supra note 75, at 10-11.
155. Id. at 11.
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retaining them as corporate advisors. 156 Businesses gradually came to
realize that good accounting practices contributed towards business
optimization 15 7 and, in turn, greater business success in KKs and YKs

and greater social credibility. Businesspeople who chose the KK, with
the strictest applicable accounting standards, benefited from being
perceived as "businessmen who are determined to manage a modern
enterprise systematically rather than small businessmen who only
wish to support their families."1 58

Note that all the strategic reasons motivating the Japanese to
choose corporate forms without withdrawal have one thing in common:
none of them related to the close corporation problem. There is also no
clear evidence to suggest that ordinary Japanese business participants

were even generally aware of the fact that KKs and YKs lacked a legal
withdrawal regime. It is thus at least a distinct possibility, if not likely,
that businesspeople were simply largely unaware of the potential

consequences flowing from withdrawal's absence in the presence of
shareholder conflicts in close corporations. It is difficult to imagine how

a person could be influenced by something that they are unaware of.
Accordingly, the fact that businesses in Japan historically
overwhelmingly chose to incorporate as corporate forms without any
withdrawal regime does not undermine the case (as advanced in Part

II.B above) that withdrawal is valuable as the necessary ultimate
solution to the close corporation. On the contrary, the fact that partial,
functional substitutes for a nonexistent system of withdrawal in law
came to be used strongly indicates unaddressed demand for

withdrawal in fact.
Matters do not appear to have changed significantly since then.
The 2005 Kaisha-ho still contains no withdrawal provisions applicable

to KKs, including ex-YKs. However, the Kaisha-ho was also a silent
revolution in withdrawal, introducing a new corporate form offering
limited liability for all members and withdrawal almost as an
afterthought.1 59 What is this new corporate form, and why did it come
to offer withdrawal? This is the subject of the next Part.

IV.

THE PRESENT: JAPAN'S

GODOKAISHA

(GK) CORPORATE FORM

The Kaisha-ho was epochal for Japanese close corporation law by
destroying one venerable close corporation form and creating a new,

156. Hamada, Shareholder'sRight, supra note 112, at 69 fig.4 (showing that 78.3%
of KKs and 73.6% of YKs with stated capital of under JPY 100 million retained certified
tax accountants [zeirishi] or other accounting professionals such as certified public
accountants [konin kaikeishij in an advisory capacity).
157. Hamada, ForthcomingLegislative Reform, supra note 75, at 11, 14.
158. Id. at 14.
159. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the impact of the Kaisha-ho).
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fledgling one, and for ushering Japan's first withdrawal regime that is
applicable to a corporate form offering full limited liability. An analysis

of withdrawal in contemporary Japanese close corporation law is
inseparable from the still relatively new Godo Kaisha (GK) corporate
form. Accordingly, this Part sets out the GK's legislative origins and
surrounding context before Part V launches into a close examination of
the finer points of Japan's current withdrawal regime.

A. The GKas a "Membership Company"
1. The Impetus for the GK

The archetypical close corporation form in Japan today is the
relatively new GK,1 60 a creature of the Kaisha-ho. The GK is not a
renamed or modernized YK; rather, it is a legislative invention
161
It
modeled upon the American limited liability company (LLC).

arose as part of a plan to create a Japanese version of the LLC that
would serve as an entity with pass-through taxation following the

precedent set by the US LLC. This original concept fell through in the
face of opposition from the Ministry of Finance; what was ultimately
162
enacted was the GK, a corporation subject to corporation tax.
In contrast to the YK, which was governed by its own statute
1 63
application (jun'y6 164) of mainly
supplemented by mutatis mutandis

provisions governing KKs from the Sh-h,

16 5

the GK is part of a

family of corporate forms known as "membership companies."

160. Although the modern KK, which includes ex-YKs that have yet to change
corporate forms or dissolve, still make up a large share of close corporations in Japan, I
do not discuss them as the Kaisha-h6 does not offer withdrawal for KK shareholders. See
supra Part. III.B.
161. Shishido Zen'ichi, Dai-3-pen Zencha [Introduction to Part III], in 14 KAISHA
HO KONMENTARU: MOCHIBUN KAIsHA (1) [COMMENTARY ON THE COMPANIES ACT:

MEMBERSHIP COMPANIES (1)] 5, 21 (Kanda Hideki ed., Shojih6mu 2014) [hereinafter
Shishido, Introduction to Part III]. The critical difference between GKs and LLCs is the
absence of pass-through taxation for the former that so characterized the latter. Id.
162. Baum & Goto, supra note 75, at 93; Sekiguchi Norihiro & Nishigaki Keng6,
Godo-Kaisha ya Yagen-Sekinin-Jigyo-Kumiai no Jitsumu-j6 no Riyorei to Mondaiten
[GKs and J-LLPs: Practical Examples and Issues], 80(11) HORITSU JIHO 18, 18-19
(2008).
163. See, e.g., YK at 19(3)-(7) (applying various Sh6-h6 provisions on restrictedtransfer shares mutatis mutandis).
164. The verb form, "jun'yo suru" is defined as "apply mutatis mutandis". Jun'yosuru, JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION COUNCIL, STANDARD LEGAL TERMS DICTIONARY 152

(Mar. 2019 ed.). Mutatis mutandis is in turn defined as "with the necessary changes in
points of detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered
when necessary, as to names, offices, and the like." Mutatis Mutandis, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
165. SAKAMAKI, supra note 73, at 240 (noting that the YK Act would total over 200
provisions if all the cross-referenced Commercial Code provisions were counted).
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2. "Membership Companies": Concept and Design Features
Under the Kaisha-ho, the GK together with two historic corporate
forms, the incorporated "commercial partnership" with unlimited
liability 166 (gamei kaisha) 167 and the incorporated "limited
partnership" (goshi kaisha), 168 now comprise a new category of
corporation, the "membership companies" (mochibun kaisha). 169
Regulated under the current regime primarily by their own separate
Part in the Kaisha-h5,170 membership companies are distinguished
from KKs in three aspects. First, they are permitted more freedom in
contractual ordering in their corporate constitutions. 171 This is
facilitated by lower incorporation and related costs; there is no need for
the constitution to be notarized, 172 and the registration license fees are
also much lower. 17 3

Second, the members are not conceptually separated from the
corporate organs; in principle they are the corporate organ. 174 There

are

no

directors

(torishimariyaku) or

boards

of

directors

(torishimariyaku-kai) as such; membership company members, by
default, are simultaneously "executive members," who have executive
powers (gyomu wo shikk5 suru), as well as "representative members"
(daihy6 sha'in), who have the authority to bind the company. 175 The

membership company also has the option of limiting representative
powers to specific executive members, and it can do so by designating

166. Cf. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 3(4) (U.K.) (defining "unlimited company" in
the UK).
167. Sho-h6, [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, arts. 62-145 (Japan)
(repealed).
168. Id. arts. 146-164 (repealed).
169. "Membership Company" (in the singular) is the semi-official translation
adopted by the Japanese government. Mochibun kaisha [Membership Company],
JAPANESE LAw TRANSLATION COUNCIL, STANDARD LEGAL TERMS DICTIONARY 276 (Mar.

2019 ed.).
170. Kaisha-h6 [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, pt. III (Japan) (containing
arts. 575-675, which govern membership company law).
171. Shishido, Introduction to Part III, supra note 161, at 9-11.
172. Kaisha-h6, art. 30(1) (requiring notarization for KKs); Sekiguchi & Nishigaki,
supra note 162, at 19 (GKs do not need notarization). The cost of notarization is JPY
50,000. K6sh6nin Tesu-ryo Rei [Cabinet Order on Notary Fees], Cabinet Order No. 224
of 1993, as amended by Cabinet Order No. 30 of 2015, art. 35.
173. T6roku Menkyo-zei H6 [Registration and License Tax Act], Law No. 35 of
1967, Beppy6 [Annexed Table] 1, Heading 24 (Kaisha mata wa Gaikoku Kaisha no
Sh6gy6 Toki [Business Registration of Companies or Foreign Companies]), No. 1, Item
(i) (KKs: the higher of 0.7% of registered capital or JPY 150,000); Item (ro) (incorporated
partnerships and limited partnerships: JPY 60,000); Item (ha) (GKs: the higher of 0.7%
of registered capital or JPY 60,000).
174.

TAKAHASHI EIJI, KAISHA HG GAISETSU [PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW]

281 (2d ed., Chu6keizaisha 2014) [hereinafter TAKAHASHI, PRINCIPLES].
175. Kaisha-h6, arts. 590, 599.

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1238

[vOL. 53:1207

them directly or by stipulating procedures for the appointment of one
176
or more representative members in the corporate constitution.
Third, membership companies are close corporations,

optimized

for

small

organizations

or

joint ventures. 178

177
The

personalistic element (jinteki yoso) is stronger in membership
companies than in the KK. 179 Membership companies are premised on

personal trust between the members, and, as a concept, stand in
opposition to the KK.180 The personalistic nature of membership
companies is stronger than in analogous organizational forms in other
81
jurisdictions; in contrast with the US limited partnership or LLC,1
1 82
membership company interests may not be publicly traded.
Finally, as Japan's GK has received relatively little attention in

the Western language literature, some clarification on terminology is
necessary to avoid confusion with the more prominent KK. The word
mochibun, which is adopted by the legislature as the name of the new
category of membership companies (mochibun kaisha) in the Kaishaho, is the Japanese word used for "membership interests" in the three

entities.1 83 They are not shares or stock (kabu), which is the term used
for equity interests in the KK. 184 The correct term for members of
mochibun kaisha is not "shareholder" (kabu'nushi), but rather
"member" (sha'in).Reflecting this, in this Article "member" is not used

interchangeably with "shareholder," and other membership company-

176. Id. art. 599(3).
177.

TAKAHASHI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 174, at 281.

178. Shishido, Introduction to PartIII, supranote 161, at 8.
179. Koide Atsushi, Dai-606-j6 [Article 606], in 14 KAISHA Ho KONMENTARU:
MOcHIBUN KAISHA (1) [COMMENTARY ON THE COMPANIES ACT: MEMBERSHIP COMPANIES

(1)] 211, 213-15 (Kanda Hideki ed., Shojihomu 2014) (explaining how this difference
influences the design of the members' withdrawal regime).
180. Shishido, Introduction to Part III, supra note 161, at 6; see also Koide, supra
note 179, at 213-14.
181. See generally Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware
Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly-Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L.
555 (2012) (analyzing operating agreements of publicly-traded LLCs and LPs in
Delaware). However, a publicly-traded LLC would lose the preferential tax treatment
granted to LLCs unless passive income makes up 90% or more of its income. I.R.C., §
7704 (2008); Manesh, supra note 181, at 573.
182. Zenichi Shishido, Legislative policy of alternative forms of business
organization: the case of Japanese LLCs, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS,
LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 374, 374 (Robert W.

Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., Edward Elgar 2015) ("[T]he [GK] form can be used
only for closely held firms in Japan, while, in the United States, the LLC form is available
for both closely held and publicly held firms ... the [KK] is the only legal form available
for publicly held firms in Japan.") (citation omitted).
183. As well as in the YK prior to forced conversion into KKs. See supra notes 7072 and accompanying text.
184. Aizawa Tetsu & Koriya Daisuke, Mochibun Kaisha [Membership Companies],
in RITSUAN TANTOSHA NI YORU SHIN-KAISHA HO NO KAISETSU [THE DRAFTSMEN'S
COMMENTARY ON THE NEW COMPANIES ACT] 153, 153 n.1 (Aizawa Tetsu ed., Bessatsu

Shoji Hbmu No. 295, Shojihomu 2006).
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B. Withdrawal:A Semi-Accidental but Defining Feature
The most important feature common to the three membership
company types is the availability of withdrawal. All three types of
membership companies are subject to the same basic withdrawal

regime set out in Articles 606 to 613.185 The basic framework had
existed for over a century: under the Commercial Code of 1899,
members of commercial partnerships and limited partnerships had
withdrawal rights. 186 By consolidating the old Commercial Code
withdrawal provisions and making them applicable to membership

companies

in

general,

the

Kaisha-hO therefore

extended

the

withdrawal regime to cover the GK. Thus, as a membership company,
the GK offers both withdrawal at will (Part V.A below) and withdrawal
on grounds (Part V.B below).

In contrast with the reform efforts of the 1980s to introduce
withdrawal into the KK and YK, 187 a key document from the reform
period reveals only the most cursory concern with why precisely the
GK should be equipped with withdrawal remedies. In the Preliminary

Draft Principlesfor the Modernization of the Corporate Law Regime,
approved on October 22, 2003188 (PreliminaryDraft Principles), it was
taken for granted that the proposed new corporate form (that became

the GK) would incorporate features of the legacy incorporated
partnership form, including withdrawal. 189 The rationale given for
withdrawal is to provide the means by which a member could withdraw

their investment; it takes the place of a transfer of shares or

185. Supplemented by special provisions applicable only to the GK in Kaisha-ho
[Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 635-36 (Japan).
186. Sh6-ho [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, arts. 84, 147 (Japan)
(repealed).

187. See supra Part III.C.2.
188. Hosei Shingikai Kaishah6 (Gendaika Kankei) Bukai [Corporate Law
(Modernization) Subcommittee, Legislative Council, Ministry of Justice], Kaisha Hosei
no Gendaika ni kansuru Yoko Shi'an [Preliminary Draft Principles for the
Modernization
of
the
Corporate
Law
Regime]
(Oct.
22,
2003),
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000071772.pdf
(last
visited
Feb.
23,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/66UK-VQAV] (archived Aug. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft
Principles]. This document was approved at the 15th Meeting of the Corporate Law
(Modernization) Subcommittee (Kaishaho(Gendaika Kankei) Bukai) of the Legislative
Council of the Ministry of Justice (Hosei Shingikai). This document, which offers up to
three options for each important point of reform (called "Proposal A", "Proposal B", and
"Proposal C" and so on), was later opened for public consultation and feedback ("public
comment" in the Japanese context). Based on the feedback received, a reworked version
would be submitted for approval by the full Legislative Council, the final version of which
would be the basis for the Ministry of Justice's legislative draftspeople's work on the
actual draft statutory provisions for the bill.
189. See Preliminary Draft Principles, supra note 188, dai-6-bu, 1 chu 1(1)-(2).
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membership interests, as would otherwise be the case in KKs or

YKs.190
The only policy question related to the withdrawal regime that

was opened for public consultation and feedback was on the relatively
technical issue of creditor protection. 19 1 Even from a relatively early
stage of the reform process, the subject of whether the GK should have
192
withdrawal was never up for debate, only the how.
The exclusive focus on "how" instead of "why" was maintained in
subsequent documents. The finalized Principlesfor the Modernization

of the Corporate Law Regime adopted on February 9, 2005 193
(Principles) did not touch

withdrawal

available

"notwithstanding

the

for

on the specific rationale for making

the

provisions

GK,
of

but
the

stated
corporate

plainly

that

constitution,

members of GKs shall have the right to withdraw if there are
unavoidable grounds." 194 The Principles also provided that the
withdrawing member shall have the right to a refund, albeit to creditor
protection rules and procedures where the GK has insufficient
distributable surplus to make the refund. 195 In his authoritative
commentary on the Principles,196 Egashira KenjirS mentioned only
that the GK member's right to withdraw where unavoidable grounds
exist follows from restrictions on the recovery of investment via
transfer of membership interests, and that the issue was already

190. Id. dai-6-bu, 1 chu 1(2) chu ("The regime shall not guarantee the recovery of
investment via transfer [of ownership interests].") (translated); H6mu-sh6 Minji-kyoku
Sanjikan-shitsu [Counsellors' Office, Civil Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice], Kaisha
H6sei no Gendaika ni kansuru Y6k6 Shi'an Hosoku Setsumei [Supplementary
Explanations to the Preliminary Draft Principles for the Modernization of the Corporate
Law Regime] (Oct. 2003), at 98, http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000071773.pdf (last visited
Feb. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/E54G-FYCL] (archived Aug. 19, 2020) [hereinafter "MOJ
Supplementary Explanations"] (connecting the new corporate form's emphasis on the
relationship between members with the decision to specify withdrawal (taisha) as the
means of recovery of investment).

&

191. Two options were offered for public feedback, with Proposal A being a
procedure akin to capital reduction, and Proposal B being akin to liquidation. See
Preliminary Draft Principles, supra note 189, Dai-6-bu, 1 ch6 2(5); MOJ Supplementary
Explanations, supra note 190, at 99.
192. The "how" question was answered by special additional rules specific to the
GK that apply on top of the general rules for membership companies. See Aizawa
K6riya, supra note 184, at 165.
193. The Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice adopted the Principles at
their plenary meeting. For the full text as adopted, see H6sei Shingikai [Legislative
Council, Ministry of Justice], Kaisha H6sei no Gendaika ni kansuru Y6k6-an [Draft
Principles for the Modernization of the Corporate Law Regime] (Feb. 9, 2005),
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020)
http://www.moj.go.jp/shingil/shingi_050209-1-1.html
[ https://perma.cc/EA25-NUHL] (archived Aug. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Finalized Draft
Principles].
194. Id. dai-3-bu, dai-2, 5(1).
195. Id. dai-3-bu, dai-2, 5(2).
196. Technically, the commentary was on the draft Principles (i.e., pre-formal
adoption by the Legislative Council), but for this Article's purposes, the contents are the
same.
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addressed in the PreliminaryDraft Principles.' 97 In a similar vein, the
official draftsmen's commentary on the Kaisha-ho provided a wealth of
detail on the "how," but was completely silent on the "why." 198
From the law reform documents, it appears that once the decision
was made to create the GK in the image of the Meiji-era incorporated
partnership, that the GK would come packaged with mandatory
withdrawal rights was a foregone conclusion. 199 Ultimately, the
advent of Japan's first withdrawal regime for close corporations
offering full limited liability would be the semiaccidental but profound

consequence of the conceptualization and creation of the GK as a
member of the "membership company" family.
Going forward, the story of withdrawal in Japan is the story of
withdrawal in the GK. The GK is not without its challenges; with

former YKs converted automatically into KKs post-Kaisha-h,

200

the

201

steady rate of new KK incorporations,
and the slow start in GK
incorporations, the status quo in which the overwhelming majority of
closely held businesses remain KKs is likely to continue for some time.

Yet, the legal significance of the GK is clear-it is the sole close
corporation form with growth potential that provides a legal
framework for withdrawal. Even if the withdrawal remedies offered by
the GK presently have little direct or immediate impact on the closely
held businesses currently incorporated as KKs, if history and recent
trends are any guide, the GK seems set to grow in popularity over

time.2 o2

197. Egashira Kenjiro, "Kaisha Hosei no Gendaika ni kansuru Yoko-an" no
Kaisetsu [Commentary on the 'Draft Principlesfor the Modernization of the Corporate
Law Regime'", in KAISHA HOSEI GENDAIKA NO GAIYO [OUTLINE OF THE MODERNIZATION

OF CORPORATE LAw] 91 (Bessatsu Shoji Homu Henshubu ed., Sh6jih6mu 2005) (referring
to the Preliminary Draft Principles, supra note 188, dai-6-bu, 1 chi 1(2)). Egashira also
noted that the Finalized Draft Principles (supranote 193) adopted Proposal B in the
Preliminary Draft Principles on creditor protection procedures. Id.
198. Aizawa & K5riya, supra note 184, at 162, 164-65.
199. See text accompanying supra notes 187-198 (explaining why the GK would
logically have a withdrawal remedy based on the events leading up to its creation).

200. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
201. See infra note 279 and accompanying text. It is impossible to determine what
percentage of new incorporations are by closely held businesses given the lack of detailed
breakdowns in the government data.
202. See infra Table 1.
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V. THE PRESENT: THE LAW OF WITHDRAWAL (TAISHA) AS APPLIED TO
THE

GK

A. Withdrawal at Will
1. General
Article 606, Paragraph 1 provides:
Each member may withdraw from the membership company at the end of the
fiscal year if the membership company's duration of corporate existence is not
specified in the corporate constitution, or is specified in the corporate
constitution as the lifetime of a particular member. In such cases, each member
[who seeks withdrawal] must give notice of intention to withdraw at least six
months in advance.

203

The raison d'dtre for withdrawal at will-also described as
withdrawal by advance notice (yokoku ni yoru taisha)-is that in
companies with neither a defined duration of existence nor withdrawal,
there is a risk that it would be against the public interest to bind

members so harshly to the corporate enterprise. 204 Similarly,
companies that would exist for the lifetime of a particular member can
be unduly restrictive for the members. In such companies, both the
member whose lifetime is defined as the company's duration of
existence as well as other members may have recourse to withdrawal
under Article 606, Paragraph 1.205
A member needs no reason to invoke withdrawal under this
Paragraph.2 06 According to prevailing opinion, the notice of intent to
2 07
The
withdraw should be addressed to the representative member.

purpose of the six months' minimum advance notice requirement is
twofold: to simplify accounting and to give due regard to the interests

of the company.2 0 8

Kaisha-ho [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 606(1) (Japan).
MATSUMOTO JOJI, NIHON KAIsHA HO RON [ON JAPANESE CORPORATE LAW]
556 (Gansh6d6shoten 1929).
205. Koide, supra note 179, at 216-17.
206. Cf. Kaisha-ho, art. 606(3) (allowing withdrawal at any time for "unavoidable
grounds"); Koide, supra note 179, at 216-17; Kosemura Kunio, § 84, in I Shin-pan
Choshaku Kaisha Ho: Kaisha Sosoku, Gomei-Kaisha, Goshi-Kaisha [CORPORATE LAW
203.

204.

COMMENTARY, NEW EDITION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, INCORPORATED COMMERCIAL
PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS] 303, 306-07 (Ueyanagi Katsur6, Otori Tsuneo

& Takeuchi Akio eds., Yuhikaku 1985).
207. OSUMI KEN'ICHIRO & IMAI HIROSHI, 1 KAISHA HO RON JOKAN [1 ON
CORPORATE LAW] 94 (3d ed., Yuhikaku 1991); Koide, supra note 179, at 217.
208. Koide, supra note 179, at 217-18 (also noting that the six months'
requirement may also be construed as a creditor protection measure); Kosemura, supra
note 206, at 306.

2020]
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2. Deviation by Contract
Withdrawal at will is a default rule that membership companies

are free to deviate from by express provision in their corporate
constitutions (Article 606, Paragraph 2). 209 The precise scope of
permissible deviations under this Paragraph is an open question. One
unresolved issue is whether, in the absence of contrary provision in the
constitution, the six months' minimum notice requirement can be
waived by the company. 210 Another issue is whether withdrawal at
will can be excluded completely for a set period of time, but here the
legislative draftsman provides a tentative answer in the affirmative. 21 1
Finally, deviation from the default rule of withdrawal at will by
constitutional provision is subject to the mandatory standard that
withdrawal on "unavoidable grounds" cannot be eliminated (Article
606, Paragraph 3),212 and it is this to which the analysis now turns.
B. Withdrawal on "UnavoidableGrounds" (yamu wo enai jiyu)
Article 606, Paragraph 3 provides: "Notwithstanding the two
Paragraphs above, each member may withdraw at any time if an
unavoidable ground exists." 213 The significance of this provision is

twofold. First, withdrawal on unavoidable grounds requires no
advance notice and takes effect immediately upon communication of
the exiting member's intent to withdraw. 214 The scope of this remedy
delimits the range of situations under which a member may seek
immediate relief. Second, Paragraph 3 circumscribes the degree of
freedom of the company to restrict withdrawal rights. 215 There is
consensus that there may be no provision in the corporate constitution
that would hinder the freedom of the member to trigger withdrawal for
unavoidable grounds at any time, making Article 606, Paragraph 3 a

mandatory provision. 2 16 Therefore, the extent to which the member's

209. There is, however, an influential strand of academic opinion that considers it
to be a semimandatory rule. See Koide, supra note 179, at 219 (citing sources relevant to
this proposition).
210. See id. at 218-19 (summarizing both arguments for and against and
preferring the position that does not permit the company to waive the notice
requirement).

Aizawa & Koriya, supra note 184, at 162.
Kaisha-ho, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 606(3) (Japan).
Id.
Koide, supra note 179, at 221; Kosemura, supra note 206, at 307; OSUMI

&

211.
212.
213.
214.

IMAI, supra note 207, at 95.

215. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
216. Koide, supra note 179, at 219, 225; Kosemura, supra note 206, at 309-10; Ota
Minoru, Mochibun-kaisha no Sha'in no Ka'ny to Taisha [Joining and Exit of
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right to withdraw is guaranteed is determined by the scope of
unavoidable grounds.
As the operative concept, unavoidable grounds requires
elaboration. Unfortunately, the legislative draftsmen's commentary of
the Kaisha-ho is far from helpful on this point:
As to "unavoidable grounds," it is not sufficient that the member in question has
changed his mind. The circumstances on which the creation of the corporate
constitution, the entry of the specific member, or the initial formation of the
company were premised must have changed so significantly that it has become
217
impossible to continue on as a member according to the original agreement.

There is only one published case since the Kaisha-ho went into
force that touches on unavoidable grounds. This case was not strictly
in the context of a GK, but rather a special corporate form for judicial
scriveners 218 that applies provisions of the Kaisha-ho relevant to
membership companies (including Article 606) mutatis mutandis to
the corporate form and its members. 219 The company commenced
2 20
whereupon the plaintiff
expulsion proceedings against the plaintiff,

22 1
gave notice of their intention to withdraw on unavoidable grounds.
222
the Tokyo District
In a decision upheld by the Tokyo High Court,
Court held that a shiho shoshi hjin is founded on a "relationship of

mutual trust between its members"; at the point in time the plaintiff

gave notice of intent to withdraw, the "relationship of trust between
the plaintiff and the other members had already been lost." 223 Hence,

Membership Companies' Members], in I KAIsHA HO TAIKEI: KAISHA HOsEI, KAISHA
GAIRON, SETSURITSU [COMPENDIUM ON CORPORATE LAW: THE CORPORATE LAw SYSTEM,
CORPORATE LAW THEORY, FORMATION] 348, 354 (Egashira Kenjiro & Monguchi Masahito

eds., Seirinshoin 2008). However, the precise extent to which the scope of "unavoidable
grounds" can be narrowed by contract is debatable. See infra Part V.B.
217. Aizawa & Koriya, supra note 184, at 162.
218. Shiho shoshi are a type of legal professional separate and distinct from the
bengoshi; they perform some of the functions that would be exclusively performed by
attorneys-at-law or solicitors in other jurisdictions such as small civil claims, preparation
of legal documents, and registration of land and corporate matters. See, e.g., Shihoshoshi Profile, NIHON SHIHO SHOSHI-KAI RENGOKAI [Japan Federation of Shiho-shoshi's
Associations], http://www.shiho-shoshi.or.jp/html/global/english/index.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/AY9T-RVE3] (archived Aug. 19, 2020) (using the term
"solicitor" to describe themselves). Shihd shoshi may incorporate using a special legal
form (shihd shoshi hojin) but it does not come with limited liability. See Shiho shoshi-ho
[Judicial Scriveners Act], Law No. 197 of 1950, art. 38 (Japan).
219. Shiho shoshi-ho, art. 46(2).
220. A membership company may commence court proceedings to expel a member
by resolution of a majority of the members (excluding the member subject to the
expulsion). Kaisha-ho, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 859 (Japan).
221. See infra notes 222-223.
222. Tokyo Kbtb Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Feb. 24, 2010, 591 Toki Joho 125,
125-26 (Japan).
223. Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 5, 2009, 591 Toki Joho 126, 128
(Japan).

20201

SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN JAPAN'S CLOSE CORPS

1245

the notice of intent to withdraw was properly founded on unavoidable
grounds. 224

Commentators on withdrawal in the GK are concerned primarily
with the extent to which "unavoidable grounds" may be narrowed by
contract, that is, the concept's absolute mandatory minimum content.
Influenced by the United States' experience with LLCs, multiple
commentators have stressed the importance of contractual freedom in
internal corporate ordering. 225 As a restraint on that freedom, the

scope of unavoidable grounds is therefore of great concern and practical
relevance. There is some agreement as to a minimum core for the
concept of "unavoidable grounds." At a bare minimum, severe conflict
over corporate management resulting in deadlock and "improper
squeeze-out" (futo na shimedashi kOi) of members 226 must be
recognized as "unavoidable grounds." 22 7
Beyond this very narrow consensus on deadlock and squeeze-outs,
the legal position remains uncertain as to the scope of "unavoidable
grounds."
In
contrast with the situation
pre-Kaisha-ho, modern

commentators seem to agree that the scope of "unavoidable grounds"
should take into consideration matters beyond the member's personal
circumstances. 228 In particular, Shishido Zen'ichi takes the position
that the default provision for companies without contrary provision by
contract must be a broad withdrawal right that recognizes a wide range
of "unavoidable grounds," including the personal circumstances of the

member; this is because the purpose of Article 606, Paragraph 3, a
mandatory provision, is to safeguard the members' freedom to

224. Id.
225. Osugi Ken'ichi, LLC-seido no Donyl [Introduction of the LLC Regime], 56
KIGYO KAIKEI 206, 206-09 (2004); Shishido Zen'ichi, Godo Goben-Kaisha [GK Joint
Ventures], in MAEDA SHIGEYUKI-SENSEI KOKI KINEN: KIGYO HO, KIN'YO HO NO SHINCHORYU [FESTSCHRIFT IN CELEBRATION OF MAEDA SHIGEYUKI'S 70TH BIRTHDAY: NEW
TRENDS IN ENTERPRISE LAW AND FINANCE LAW] 211, 220ff (Koide Atsushi, Kozuka
Soichiro & Goto Gen eds., Sh6jih6mu 2013) [hereinafter Shishido, GK Joint Ventures].

226. This ground is never elaborated upon in the literature on withdrawal.
227. Shishido, GK Joint Ventures, supra note 225, at 235; Egashira Kenjir6, Osugi
Ken'ichi, Niinomi Hiroshi, Ito Tsuyoshi & Kuroda Yutaka, Zadankai: Gdd Kaisha-to no
Jittaito Kadai (6) [Panel Discussion: The Reality and Issues of GKs, etc.], 1944 SHOJI
HOMU 6, 17-18 (2011) (Statement by Osugi Ken'ichi) [hereinafter Egashira, Osugi,
Niinomi, It6 & Kuroda, Panel Discussion]. Both sources point out that the situations
contemplated may also suffice as grounds for judicial dissolution (on unavoidable
grounds).
228. See, e.g., Egashira, Osugi, Niinomi, It6 & Kuroda, Panel Discussion, supra
note 227, at 17 (arguing that when determining if unavoidable grounds are present, not
only should the circumstances of the member be considered, but also those of the
company, which would after all be affected by the member's withdrawal).
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2 30
Shishido made the following three
withdraw. 229 In a later work,

points. First, family enterprises should have weak exit rights.

231

Second, opportunism in venture capital-funded businesses should be
232
Third, and in quasi-partnershipkept in check by the threat of exit.

like 233 businesses where all members participate in management, the
234
but that neither
strength of exit rights should be left to negotiation,
excessively rigid mandatory rules nor unlimited freedom of contract
235
Shishido's
would be desirable for efficient bargaining outcomes.
position, while seemingly against generous mandatory withdrawal
rights, is nonetheless consistent with strong withdrawal rights that,
236
without being mandatory, are not easy to contract out of carelessly.

229. Shishido, Introduction to Part HI, supra note 161, at 15; see also Shishido
Zen'ichi, God5-Kaisha no Taisha-in no Mochibun Hydka: Jto Seigen Kabushiki no
Hydka to no Hikaku [Valuation of the Membership Interests of Withdrawing Members
from the GK: A Comparisonwith the Valuation of Shares with Transfer Restrictions], in
KIGYO HO NO GENZAI: AOTAKE SHO'ICHI-SENSEI KOKI KINEN [ENTERPRISE LAW'S
PRESENT: FESTSCHRIFIT IN CELEBRATION OF AOTAKE SHOICHI'S 70TH BIRTHDAY] 427, 435

(Deguchi Masayoshi, Yoshimoto Ken'ichi, Nakajima Hiromasa & Tanabe Hiroyasu eds.,
Shinzansha 2014) [hereinafter Shishido, Valuation].
230. The core idea in this work is that exit mechanisms (which include not only
withdrawal but also dissolution) and compensation claims (i.e., damages claims for
breach of duty of loyalty (chujitsugimu) against KK directors and membership company
members) serve as substitutes for each other. Shishido Zen'ichi, Hi-kokai Kigy5 ni okeru
DOki-dzuke Kosh5: Chajitsu Gimu to Taishutsu-ken no Daitai-sei no Kanten kara
[Incentive Bargainingin Closed Enterprises:From the Perspectiveof Substitutability of
the Duty of Loyalty and Exit Rights], in KAISHA-HO NO TOTATSU-TEN TO TENBO: MORI
JUNJIRO-SENSEI TAISHOKU KINEN RONBUNSHU [THE ULTIMATE GOAL AND OUTLOOK FOR
CORPORATE LAW: FESTSCHRIFT FOR THE OCCASION OF PROFESSOR MORI JUNJIRO'S
RETIREMENT] 209, 215-17 (Tokumoto Minoru, Jo Chibun, Sato Makoto, Tanaka Shin'ichi
& Kasahara Takeaki eds., H6ritsubunkasha 2018) [hereinafter Shishido, Incentive
Bargaining].
231. Id. at 216.
232. Id. at 216-17.
233. The exact word used was kydd6 jigy6-gata, but it is functionally most similar
to the classic, quasi-partnership close corporation.
234. Shishido, Incentive Bargaining,supra note 230, at 216.
235. Id. at 223.
236. Different sub-types of close corporations have different needs, and mandatory
rules may create difficulties. Nonetheless, it is easier for minorities to selectively
contract out of existing rights and solutions than it is to create them from scratch by

contract, especially those based on legal standards that takes into account a range of
facts and circumstances. A legal standard covering both fault and no-fault scenarios that
are difficult, if not impossible, to foresee and plan for ex ante also prevents ex ante
contractual arrangements by majorities that facilitate later opportunism. See generally
Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032 (2012) (discussing the concept of "altering rules" that govern how parties contract
around a default).
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C. Effect of Withdrawal
A member who has exercised the right to withdrawal at will ceases
to be a member at the end of the fiscal year. 237 For withdrawal on
unavoidable grounds, withdrawal takes effect immediately upon the
member's communication of intent to withdraw to a representative

member of the company. 238 With the termination of status as a
member of a GK, any rights and obligations pertaining to membership
or management of the GK as between the now ex-member and the GK
are also dissolved-save one. 239 Article 611, Paragraph 1 provides that
the withdrawn member is also entitled to the "refund" of her

membership interest (mochibun no haraimodoshi).240 Note that
despite the functional similarity between refund and buyout, the word
for "refund" (haraimodoshi) is specific to the membership company
context 2 4 1 and is not used interchangeably with "buyout" (kaitori) in

Japanese legal language. 242 In this Article, the word "refund" is used
exclusively
context.

when writing in the Japanese

membership company

Regardless of the form of the member's capital contribution, the
member is entitled to a monetary refund. 243 The only party against
whom the refund claim can be enforced is the company, not any of its
(remaining) members. 244 As monetary sums are involved, next up is

the subject of valuation.

237. This is implicit from Kaisha-ho, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art.
606(1) (Japan) (governing voluntary withdrawal by members).
238. Koide, supra note 179, at 221.
239. The situation is different for the other two membership companies;
withdrawn members continue to be liable in some respects for a period of two years.
Kaisha-ho, art. 612(1)-(2); see also RONTEN KAISETSU SHIN-KAISHA HO: SENMON NO
MICHISHIRUBE [COMMENTARY ON THE NEW COMPANIES ACT: A THOUSAND-QUESTION

GUIDE] 590 (Aizawa Tetsu, Hadama Masami & Koriya Daisuke eds., Shbjihomu 2006)
(explaining why Article 612 does not apply to ex-GK members) [hereinafter RONTEN
KAISETSU].

240.

Kaisha-h6, art. 611(1).

241.

The term only appears in Kaisha-ho provisions

governing membership

companies and not in the general or KK-specific provisions.
242. Cf. Kaisha-ho, art. 140 et seq. (using kaitoriand variants thereof in the context
of purchase of restricted-transfer shares in a KK); id. at art. 785 et seq. (same in the
context of appraisal rights in the KK).
243. Id. art. 611(3).
244. This is implicit; there is nothing in the literature that even suggests that any
person other than the company may-or should-be liable to pay the refund. There is
also a functional similarity between stock repurchases by a KK and the payment of a

refund of a withdrawn member's membership interest by a membership company. See
Koriya Daisuke & Hosokawa Mitsuru, Mochibun Kaisha no Keisan [Membership
Company Accounting Matters], in RITSUAN TANTOSHA NI YORU SHIN-KAISHA HO KANKEI
HOMUSHO-REI NO KAISETSU [THE DRAFTSMEN'S COMMENTARY ON THE MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE ORDINANCES RELATING TO THE NEW COMPANIES AcT] 165 (Aizawa Tetsu ed.,
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E. Valuation
To

calculate

the

refund

quantum

withdrawing member's membership
245
company must be performed.

corresponding

interest,

to

the

a valuation of the

1. Default Provision
On the critical subject of
concrete guidance. Article 611,
between the member who has
shall be conducted on the basis

valuation, the Kaisha-ho offers little
Paragraph 2 provides: "Accounting as
exited and the membership company
of the company's asset situation as at

246
the time of exit."

Per the legislative draftsmen, the valuation should be based on
"the mark-to-market valuation of the assets and liabilities of the
company on a going concern basis, with future earnings and other
factors taken into consideration." 247 However, this short statement
248
The
does not settle the longstanding debate in academic literature.

249
prevailing opinion favors valuing the company as a going concern.

A substrand of this takes the position that this should not be on a book
value basis, as in a profit and loss statement; rather, without
undervaluing assets or overvaluing liabilities, revaluation of fixed
assets (within appropriate boundaries) is permitted, as is the inclusion
of intangibles. 25 0 More recently, support has emerged for an approach
that disregards book value in favor of using, in principle, only
251
discounted cash flow (DCF).

Bessatsu Shoji H6mu No. 300, Shojih6mu 2006). This supports the position that only the
company is liable to the withdrawn member in respect of the refund. If the GK fails to
take the necessary steps to pay, the withdrawn member may be able to apply for the GK
to be judicially dissolved. See Aizawa & Koriya, supra note 184, at 165.
245. Kaisha-ho, art. 611(1)-(2); RONTEN KAISETSU, supra note 239, at 589.
246. Kaisha-ho, art 611(2). Note that I use "exited" and "exit" in lieu of
"withdrawn" and "withdraw" because the original Japanese term taisha is broader than
withdrawal as I define and use in this Article.
247.

RONTEN KAISETSU, supra note 239, at 589.

248. See infra notes 249-251 and accompanying text.
249. See Matsumoto Nobuko, Dai-611-j [Article 611], in 14 KAISHA HO
KONMENTARU:

MOCHIBUN KAISHA

(1)

[COMMENTARY ON THE COMPANIES AcT:

MEMBERSHIP COMPANIES (1)] 252, 263 (Kanda Hideki ed., Shojihdmu 2014) and
references cited therein.
250. Id. at 263; OSUMI & IMAI, supra note 207, at 100-01 n.2.
251. Summarized in Matsumoto, supra note 249, at 263 and Shishido, Introduction
to PartIII, supra note 161, at 13.
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Judicial precedents are generally consistent with a going concern
approach to valuation. The leading case, 252 which was decided by the
Supreme Court in 1969, concerned not a company, but rather a

cooperative

enterprise

regulated

under

a

specific

law

on

cooperatives 253 with a provision similar to the Kaisha-h6's Article 611,
Paragraph 2.254 The Supreme Court held that:
In general, the valuation of the cooperative's assets, on which accounting of the
exiting cooperative member's membership interest would be based, should not

be performed based on the so-called book value that is used for purpose of
calculating the cooperative's profit and loss. Instead, the valuation should be
performed on the premise that (1) the cooperative would operate the business as
a going concern, and (2) the business would be sold in its entirety on the most
advantageous terms.

255

Subsequent reported decisions in the lower courts from the 1980s have

generally followed the Supreme Court's lead. 2 56
The going concern approach generally adopted by the courts

should not be conflated with DCF valuation. 257 Importantly, Japan
experienced an economic bubble that resulted in extremely high land
prices, especially towards the end of the 1980s. 258 Inflated land prices
played an important role in the reported cases, as the main point of

dispute was over the valuation of land forming part of the assets of the
cooperative or company. 259 Without exception, the net asset value of
the entity in question was greater than its DCF valuation. 260 In one

252. Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 11, 1969, 23(12) MINSHO 2447 (Japan),
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanreijp/974/051974_hanrei.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2020) [https://perma.cc/U359-CKFS] (archived July 13, 2020).
253. Specifically, the Chzsh6 Kigyo-to Kyodo Kumiai Ho [Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprise Cooperatives Act], Law No. 181 of 1949 [hereinafter SME Cooperatives Act].
For an overview of cooperative laws in Japan, see Akira Kurimoto, Japan, in
&

INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF COOPERATIVE LAW 503 (Dante Cracogna, Antonio Fici

Hagen Henry eds., Springer 2013).
254. Compare SME Cooperatives Act, art. 20(2) (providing that the valuation of
the equity interest of a withdrawn cooperative member shall be conducted based on the
cooperative's assets as of the end of the business year in which withdrawal occurred)
with Kaisha-ho, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 611(2) (Japan) (providing that
valuation of a withdrawn GK member's equity interest shall be conducted based on the
asset position of the GK at the time of withdrawal).
255. Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 11, 1969, 23(12) Minshi 2447 (Japan); see
also Matsumoto, supra note 249, at 264 (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision).
256. See, e.g., Kobe Chiho Saibansho [Kobe Dist. Ct.] Aug. 29, 1986, 1222 HANREI
JIHO [HANJI] 135 (Japan); Nagoya Chiho Saibansho [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Sept. 29, 1987,
1264 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 128 (Japan). Both were commercial partnership (gomei
kaisha) cases.
257. Shishido, Introduction to PartIII, supra note 161, at 14.
258. See Robert L. Cutts, Power from the Ground Up: Japan's Land Bubble, 68
HARV. BUS. REV. 164, 168-69 (1990) (describing the impact of inflated land values on
corporations).
259. Shishido, Valuation, supra note 229, at 428 n.3.
260. Shishido, Introduction to PartIII, supra note 161, at 14.
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exceptional case from 1995, to avoid an asset bubble-influenced
valuation that was disproportionately large compared to the company's

earnings, the Tokyo District Court adopted a weighted average of the
DCF and net asset value figures. 26 1 Taking the historical context into
consideration, Shishido argues that the going concern approach laid
down in the 1969 Supreme Court decision should not be construed as
a general requirement for DCF valuation; instead, the valuation can

be on either the DCF or net asset value basis, whichever is higher.
Further, he posits that valuation on a net asset value basis should be
based on both the market value of the business sold as a whole and the
most advantageous terms possible, and not the book value or
26 2
liquidation value.

2. Provision in Corporate Constitution
Opinion is divided on whether Article 611, Paragraph 2 is a

mandatory provision, and if so, the scope of mandatory regulation. The
legislative draftsmen appear to contradict themselves on this point. On

the one hand, they take the position that the Kaisha-hO'sprovisions on
membership companies are generally mandatory unless the Act itself
expressly permits deviation by provision in the corporate
constitution. 26 3 On the other hand, the draftsmen appear to accept,
without elaboration, that where the company has included provisions

on valuation in the corporate constitution those provisions should be
followed 2 64-despite the absence of any Kaisha-ho provision within
Article 611 permitting deviation. A number of academic commentators

5
have also expressed uncertainty on the subject, 26 although Shishido

stands firm in his position that Article 611 is a default provision that
26 6
may be modified by the company's constitution.

261. See Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 27, 1995, 1541 HANREI JIHO
130 (Japan) (weighting DCF and net asset value 6:4).
262. Shishido, Valuation, supra note 229, at 428 n.3. Indeed, in its 1969 judgment
the Supreme Court held that the lower court did not err in valuing the land at issue on
a market value basis rather than book value. SaikS Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 11, 1969,
at
2,
MINSHU
2447,
23(12)
https://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanreijp/974/051974_hanrei.pdf (last visited Sept.
15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U359-CKFS] (archived July 13, 2020) (Japan) (cited
pagination only in online version of case).
263.

RONTEN KAISETSU, supra note 239, at 563.

264. Id. at 590.
265. Egashira, Osugi, Niinomi, Ito & Kuroda, Panel Discussion, supranote 227, at
18 (Statements by Egashira Kenjiro (expressing doubt), Osugi Ken'ichi (arguing that
Article 611, Paragraph 2 is a default rule but conceding the plausibility of an alternative
interpretation), and Niinomi Hiroshi (acknowledging the possibility that the provision is
a mandatory one and also hinting at tax implications)).
266. Shishido, GK Joint Ventures, supra note 225, at 238 n.54 (arguing that an
interpretation of Article 611 as a mandatory rule would be at odds with the general
legislative intent to reserve to the parties the broadest possible contractual freedom).
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Amidst this uncertainty and the absence of any definitive case
precedent, it seems at least arguable, if not implicitly conceded, that
the company may specify a valuation mechanism in its constitution.

From a practical standpoint, the important questions are whether
there are limits to the company's freedom to do so and the content of
those limits, if any. A strand of pre-Kaisha-hddoctrine suggests that
the company's discretion is unfettered in this respect, and even a
constitutional provision specifying that an exited member should
receive no refund would be enforceable. 26 7 Countering this is another
doctrinal strand arguing that extreme provisions in a corporate
constitution, such as those denying outright or severely restricting the
exiting member's refund, may be at odds with the fundamental forprofit nature of the membership company. 268 In particular,
constitutional provisions denying refunds outright may be invalid. 26 9
VI. THE FUTURE: THE TRAJECTORY OF WITHDRAWAL JURISPRUDENCE
AND SCHOLARSHIP IN JAPAN

A. The GK's GrowingPopularityand Legal Significance
Going forward, withdrawal's importance to Japanese corporate
law appears to be entirely dependent on the GK's popularity as a
corporate form. The critical question is: What are the GK's prospects?

267. Matsumoto, supra note 249, at 264.
268. Id. at 265.
269. Osugi Ken'ichi, Mochibun Kaisha, Minp6 Kumiai no H6ritsu Mondai [Legal
Issues in Membership Companies and Civil Law Partnerships],in KAJSHA, KIN'YU, H6
(JO-KAN) [CORPORATIONS, FINANCE, LAW (VOL 1 OF 2)] 53, 79 (Iwahara Shinsaku,

Yamashita Tomonobu & Kanda Hideki eds., Shojihbmu 2013).
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The GK has not lived up to the expectations surrounding its birth.
Subject to corporation tax and denied the pass-through tax advantages
that were a key motivation behind the GK's US LLC-inspired design,

2 70
the greatest merit of the new form as originally conceived was lost.

Ten years on, the GK remains something of a novelty to the Japanese
people 27 1 and is at a disadvantage in terms of brand name recognition

compared to the KK. 272 Website articles by legal, accounting, and tax
professionals targeted at people interested in incorporating companies

point out differences between the KK and GK that might seem banal
to the uninitiated outsider, but which are of a practical nature and

carry weight in the Japanese business context. Take, for example, the
titles that may be used by business owners on their business cards.
Those who prize the time-honored and universally recognized
"representative director" (daihyo torishimariyaku) title have no choice
but to use a KK, whereas those who would be satisfied with

273
"representative member" (daihyo sha'in) may find the GK adequate.
However, as the Japanese word for member (sha'in) in the nonlegal
context nearly always means an "employee" of a firm, 274

representative members run the risk of being mistaken as mere
company employees due to a linguistic quirk. The perceived gap in
status between the "high-ranking" KK-representative director and the

"mere employee" GK-representative member should not be
underestimated in Japan's status-conscious society. However, there
are exceptions to the GK's branding weaknesses; the importance of
choice of corporate form to the business' brand value varies by
industry.275

270. Sekiguchi & Nishigaki, supra note 162, 18-19.
271. See Setsuyaku Shacho Henshubu [Thrifty CEO Editorial Board], Kabushiki
Kaisha wa mo Jidai Okure!? Godo Kaisha ga Kyaz6 suru Riyu to wa [The KKIs Already
Behind the Times!? Reasons for the Rapid Increase in GKs], SETSUYAKU SHACHO
[THRIFTY
CEO]
(July
8,
2015),
Fti
https://web.archive.org/web/20190601164132/https://setsuyaku.ceo/post/505/4K
01"i- iM*L-fliFt
it5
[https://perma.cc/6VHTV-TNQ5] (archived July 8,
Ic
n (A
Lit~Lif,
3 o~a) fF~j
n~
''C[iJfJ
2020) ("
/ M4 - 7b',, z PhA Q ol IiLI -C04t T9C~0 ["Despite
i[a0
growth in registrations, as compared to the KK the GK still enjoys less trust from the
public. This is especially so in transactions with corporates."]).
272. Uchida Atsushi, Hjin-ka (Hojin Nari) Suru nara Kabushiki Kaisha to Godo
Kaisha wa Docchi ga Ii? [If I Were to Incorporate, Which Is Better - KK or GK?], UCHIDA
ATSUSHI ZEIRISHI JIMUSHO [OFFICES OF UCHIDA ATSUSHI, CERTIFIED PUBLIC TAX
2016),
1,
(Apr.
ACCOUNTANT],

https://web.archive.org/web/20171028160344/https://www.uchitax.com/2016/04/01/comp
aniy-formation-llc/ [https://perma.c/YR7A-VA6V] (archived July 9, 2020).
273. See, e.g., id.; Subaru Juku Un'ei Kanri-nin [Operations Manager, Subaru
School], Godo Kaisha to Kabushiki Kaisha no Chigai wo Osaeru 14 no POINTO [The
Differences Between the GK and the KK in 14 Points], SUBARU JUKU [SUBARU SCHOOL],
(May 27, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20171028160612/http://subaru-juku.com/llc-
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Despite obstacles and teething troubles, the tide appears to be
turning in favor of the GK. Since the GK became available in 2006,276

incorporation numbers have risen steadily, according to business
registration records from the Ministry of Justice. 277 The figures with
separate breakdowns for new incorporations and incorporations via

mergers or entity conversions are as follows:
Table 1
Year

Growth of GKs 2006-2018
New

Mergers &

Total1

Incorporations
Conversions
20062
3,392
58
3 450
2007
6,076
110
6,186
2008
5,413
90
5,503
2009
5,771
109
5,880
2010
7,153
114
7,267
2011
9,130
115
9,245
2012
10,889
138
11,027
2013
14,581
144
14,725
2014
19,808
158
19,966
2015
22,223
158
22,381
2016
23,787
'148
23,935
2017
27,270
160
27,430
2018
29,076
159
29,235
Source: Business RegistrationStatistics, Ministry of Justice (as of
31 May 2019)278

joint%E2%80%90stock-company-difference-867
[https://perma.cc/3MCN-2JZW]
(archived July 9, 2020).
274. Cf.
-fR, WEBLIO, https://ejje.weblio.jp/content/%E7%A4%BE%E5%93%A1
(last visited Aug. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BQ6F-W2DF] (archived July 9, 2020)
(translating the Japanese word for "member" into English; one definition includes
"employee (of a company)" and most derivative terms and examples given are based on
this meaning).
275. Shiranai to son suru? Godo Kaisha no MERITTO, DEMERITTO [At a
DisadvantageIf You Don't Know? Pros and Cons of GKs], KEIEI HAKKA [MANAGEMENT
HACKER],
(Sept.
27,
2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20171028160912/https://keiei.freee.co.jp/2013/09/27/goudou
gaisyal [https://perma.cc/N5JP-YWSR] (archived July 9, 2020) (listing the respective
merits of setting up GKs in the care, construction, food and beverage, aesthetics and
beauty, property leasing, information technology (IT), consulting, and foreign exchange
investment industries).
276. The Kaisha-h5 entered force on May 1, 2006. Kaisha H no Shiko Kijitsu wo
Sadameru Seirei [Cabinet Order Establishing the Effective Date of the Companies Act],
Cabinet Order No. 77 of 2006, KANPO [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Supp. No. 69, at 10.
277. See infra note 278.
278.
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TOKEI-KYOKU

[STATISTICS

BUREAU,

MINISTRY
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AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS], Shogy, Hojin Toki (Nenji-hyo) [Business and
Corporation Registrations (Multiyear Statistics with Yearly Breakdowns)], E-STAT:
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incidents of members withdrawing will increase with time. The

salience

of the

withdrawal

regime

to

GKs

will

also

grow

correspondingly as more withdrawal cases will appear in court and in
the law reports, providing valuable raw material for scholars and

commentators to chew on. There is hope that attorneys and judges will
devise less problematic legal solutions than in the past 280-but where
should they turn for guidance?

B. Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: What the Law and
Scholarship of the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany Can
Contribute to the Development of Withdrawal in Japan

More than ten years since the Kaisha-ho went into force, there is
still hardly any jurisprudence on withdrawal from the GK. While this
may be cause for concern for practitioners and businesses seeking
certainty, there is also opportunity. In contrast to the KK (and YK), the

GK has

clear statutory

language-in

particular,

"unavoidable

grounds"-authorizing withdrawal. 28 1 The absence of firm judicial
precedent constraining the scope of withdrawal also means that there
is still a possibility of developing an effective withdrawal remedy
catering to the needs of close corporations in Japan. The primary
difficulty, however, is with the state of the domestic debate in Japan.
There is existing domestic Japanese scholarship on the GK drawing on
the very limited body of literature inherited from legacy membership

company forms and from the pre-Kaisha-hoera,2 82 but that by itself is
inadequate to meet the needs of a modern and increasingly popular
close corporation form.

That is where comparative corporate law has much to offer. It is a
fact that close corporations are a shared phenomenon in leading,
developed economies; it is also true that withdrawal is a common
feature in such jurisdictions. 283 Notwithstanding the fact that it would
be highly unusual for Japanese practicing jurists (whether attorneys
or judges) to draw directly on foreign scholarship and precedent in
preparing legal opinions or deciding cases applying local (Japanese)
corporate law, academic jurists are not so constrained. Even outside

the realm of law reform, there is scope for scholars to enrich the legal

280. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing past approaches in KKs and YKs).
281. Kaisha-ho, art. 606(3).
282. This is especially true for the law on withdrawal. See, e.g., Shishido,
Introduction to Part III, supra note 161, at 13-14.
283. See supra Part II.C (illustrating the prevalence of withdrawal remedies in
leading economies); infra Part VI.B.1-3 (discussing the applicability of withdrawal
remedy principles from leading economies to the development of the withdrawal remedy
in Japan); see also Alan K. Koh, Shareholder Protection in Close Corporations: Theory,
Operation, and Application of Shareholder Withdrawal (unpublished Dr. jur.
dissertation, Goethe University Frankfurt, June 4, 2019) [hereinafter Koh, Shareholder
Protection] (on file with the editors).
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discourse by using comparative corporate law analysis of appropriate
foreign laws when preparing expert opinions or writing scholarly
commentary that would be read and relied upon by practicing jurists.

The goal of this Part is to get the hypothetical ball rolling on using
comparative corporate law to strengthen discourse on the Japanese
GK, whether in a purely domestic (Japanese) or comparative setting.
It briefly touches on the law on withdrawal in three leading developed
jurisdictions-the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germanyfor insights that may benefit the development of GK's withdrawal
regime and then offers a brief assessment of potential lines of inquiry
that jurists working on the GK may find worthwhile to explore.

1. United States: Greater Complexity without Corresponding Guidance
What little foreign influence there is in Japanese legal scholarship
2 84
The
on withdrawal in the GK appears to be primarily American.
most prominent key players in GK law- Shishido Zen'ichi and Osugi
Ken'ichi, as well as Egashira Kenjiro, the intellectual force behind the
Kaisha-ho-drawpredominantly on US LLC law and literature to the
285
However, there is reason to
exclusion of every other foreign law.
maintain a healthy skepticism about exclusive or excessive reliance on
US LLC law in discourse on the Japanese GK.

First, the basis for looking to the US LLC-or more precisely, the
individual LLC forms of the more than fifty states and territories with
LLC statutes-for inspiration with respect to the GK as it stands has
not been convincingly articulated in the Japanese literature. It is

difficult to characterize the GK as it exists under the Kaisha-h6 as a
legal transplant of the US LLC because the GK de lege lata does not
286
The GK is, at best, a domestic
offer pass-through tax treatment.
entity "inspired by" or "initially modeled on" the American LLC but

which ultimately has much more in common with other Japanese
business entities.

Second, and specifically on the subject of withdrawal, federal
taxation rules have been the driving force behind the US LLC

throughout its entire history within the United States itself. Great

See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Egashira Kenjiro, Godo-Kaisha Seido no MERITTO: Shimedashi
Boshi-saku no Sokumen [The Merits of the GK Regime: The Aspect of Squeeze-out
284.
285.

&

Prevention Measures], in MONGUCHI MASAHITO SAIBANKAN TAIKAN KINEN: ATARASHII
JIDAI NO MINJI SHIHO [FESTScHRIFI IN CELEBRATION OF JUDGE MONGUCHI MASAHITO'S
RETIREMENT: CIVIL JUSTICE IN A NEW AGE] 241 (Matsushima Hideki, Ito Makoto

Fukuda Takahisa eds., Shojih6mu 2011) (citing only US sources for foreign law except
one tangential reference to a Japanese source on a point of German law not relevant to

GKs or membership companies as such); Shishido, Valuation, supra note 229; Shishido,
Introduction to Part III, supra note 230 (citing only US law); Osugi, supra note 225, at
212 n.12 (mentioning the UK LLP only once and tangentially).
286. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
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demand existed for an entity that would qualify for partnership
taxation without sacrificing limited liability. Prior to 1997,287 the only

way to do that was to ensure that the entity lacked at least two of the
following three corporate characteristics: continuity of life, free
transferability of interests, and centralization of management; 288
usually the first two. 28 9 The generous rights of withdrawal at will

offered by the earliest state LLC statutes-which were often bundled
-

with dissolution of the entity upon withdrawal of any member 29 0
were designed to avoid a finding of continuity of life. 29 1 Once the
Internal Revenue Service moved away from a corporate resemblance

test and to a "check-the-box" regime where the entity can itself choose
whether to be taxed as a corporation or partnership, 292 state
legislatures

gradually

eliminated

withdrawal.

293

Crucially,

legislatures did not seem to have considered the implications of
abolishing or curtailing withdrawal on member oppression (i.e., the

close corporation

problem). 294

The former prevalence

of and

subsequent disappearance of withdrawal from the LLC is thus driven

by factors that do not hold even remotely true in Japan, where passthrough taxation is not permitted for the GK at all and there is only
one uniform national-level statute for business corporate entities.
Although the United States' experience with close corporations in
the narrow sense (i.e., non-LLCs) avoids many of the problems with
LLC law and jurisprudence, it is not without its own flaws. It is beyond

287. When "check-the-box" regulations permitting the entity to elect whether to be
taxed as a corporation or partnership went into force. See Simplification of Entity
Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,587 (Dec. 18, 1996) (providing that changes
to 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701, among other provisions, would take effect January 1, 1997).
288. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability
Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership
ClassificationRegulations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565,573 (1995) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.77012 (as amended in 1993)).
289. Carter G. Bishop, Treatment of Members Upon Their Death and Withdrawal
from a Limited Liability Company: The Case for a Uniform Paradigm, 25 STETSON L.
REV. 255, 259-60 & n.17 (1995); Moll, Minority Oppression, supra note 51, at 929-30.
290. Dissolution could be avoided, but the withdrawing member would be entitled
to have their interest bought out. Moll, Minority Oppression, supra note 51, at 928.
291. Id. at 930.
292. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1-301.7701-3 (2020) (defining and classifying business
entities for tax purposes); for the Internal Revenue Service's evolving approach to LLC
taxation and role in the drafting of LLC statutes, see Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins
Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1466-84 (1998).
293. Moll, Minority Oppression, supra note 51, at 932-40. Compare ULLCA 1996
§§ 601(1) (providing for a default right to withdraw at will), 701(a)(1) (providing for a
default obligation of LLC to buy out the withdrawing member's interest) with Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act §§ 601(a) (providing for default power to dissociate at
will), 603(a)(3) and 404(b) and comments thereto (no provision for a default right of
dissociating member to receive a distribution for their interest) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2013). On modern "Hotel California" provisions, see ROBERT R. KEATINGE, LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN & THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANIES § 14:2 & n.4 (2d ed. 2010) (loose-leaf).
294. See Moll, JudicialDissolution, supra note 52, at 106-07.
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reasonable doubt that the law and jurisprudence of close corporations
in the United States is diverse and complex. 295 Complicating matters
is the fact that Delaware, notwithstanding its dominance in the
publicly listed corporation sphere, is not a dominant player in the close
29 7
corporation universe, 296 and is particularly hostile to withdrawal.

It is neither desirable nor practical for Japanese jurists to devote vast
amounts of attention and energy to a rigorous study of US close
corporations in their full variety spread across more than fifty states
and territories. US close corporation law thus offers little in the way of
clarity or convenience to foreign jurists seeking to understand it for

practical, law reform-oriented purposes.
This Article's assessment that US law is not an appropriate

subject for comparison may surprise, given the fact that, for better or
worse, the United States (often Delaware specifically) is widely used
as a comparator jurisdiction in comparative corporate law both in and

out of Japan. 298 Fortunately, there are other similarly advanced
economies with sophisticated legal systems that have developed
relatively coherent and sophisticated bodies of jurisprudence on
withdrawal that deserve greater attention as subjects of comparative
corporate law. Next up for a closer look are two such jurisdictions: the
United Kingdom and Germany.
2. United Kingdom: Proven Track Record of Shareholder Protection

against Economically Harmful Conduct through Unfair Prejudice
At first glance, the United Kingdom may be a relatively odd choice
of comparator jurisdiction with Japan, given that the two nations'

295. For leading treatises, see generally DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO,
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS (2017); O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2; O'NEAL AAND THOMPSON'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 18.
296. See generally Jens Dammann & Matthias Schindeln, The Incorporation
Choices of Privately Held Corporations, 27 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 79 (2009) (reporting that
most closely-held corporations in the US incorporate in the state where the corporation
has its primary place of business).
297. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993) (rejecting the
notion that the court has the power to order buyouts in the absence of express contractual
arrangement).

298. See, e.g., Alan K. Koh, Masafumi Nakahigashi & Dan W. Puchniak, Land of
the Falling "Poison"Pill: Understanding Defensive Measures in Japan on Their Own
Terms, 41 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 687, 714-19 (2020) (comparing Japan and Delaware);
KRAAKMAN, ARMOUR, DAVIES, ENRIQUES, HANSMANN, HERTIG,

HOPT,

KANDA & ROCK,

supra note 13 (comparing the United States-and particularly Delaware-with other
jurisdictions including Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Brazil);
Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 2171, 2198-215 (2005) (comparing Japan and Delaware); Koh, supra
note 85 (comparing Japan and Delaware); Shishido, Introduction to PartIII, supra note
161, at 15 (citing California and Delaware statutes and a Uniform Act in the very
paragraph discussing Article 606, Paragraph 3 of the Kaisha-ho); Shishido, Incentive
Bargaining,supra note 230 (comparing Japan and Delaware).
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corporate laws have little connection by way of direct transplant or
transfer, 299 and that scholars working on UK law-or even AngloCommonwealth law more broadly-are a relative minority in Japanese
legal academia. 30 0 The United Kingdom's domestic corporate law is
particularly useful when it comes to the subject of withdrawal-which
takes the form of share buyout orders made under the court's unfair
prejudice jurisdiction-for two reasons.
First, unfair prejudice is a popular, proven remedy with a
substantial body of legal writing. In particular, extensive practitioner
treatises 301 summarizing salient points of the United Kingdom's
burgeoning body of relatively uniform unfair prejudice jurisprudence

make it relatively accessible even to foreign audiences.
Second, the courts have taken to making judicial adjustments
when performing share valuations that take into account actions and
behavior of the defendant that have had the effect of decreasing
corporate value or specific detriment to the plaintiff shareholder. 30 2
This has the effect of achieving fairer results in individual cases and
strengthening the extent of the protection conferred by the unfair

299. An oft-cited example of UK influence on Japanese corporate and securities
law is the mandatory bid rule; however, not only is that not strictly speaking binding
"corporate law," but the characterization of the Japanese mandatory bid rule as modeled

on the UK is questionable at best. See Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The
Enigma of Hostile Takeovers in Japan:Bidder Beware, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 4, 6 n.4,
24-27 (2018) (distinguishing the Japanese regime from that of the United Kingdom).
More recently, the UK has exerted great influence via its Stewardship Code, although
the resulting Japanese product differs from the UK original in material respects.
Compare Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Codes: The Case of Japan, 15

BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 365, 383 ("The framework of the Japanese Stewardship Code is
heavily influenced by the UK Stewardship Code.") with Gen Goto, Alan K. Koh & Dan
W. Puchniak, Diversity of ShareholderStewardship in Asia:Faux Convergence, 53 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 872-74 (2020) (analyzing the differences between Japan's
stewardship code and the codes of the UK and Singapore).
300. On withdrawal specifically, see generally HIROTA TETSUJI, SH6SU
KABUNUSHI NO HOGO TO KYUSAI [MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION AND REMEDIES]

(Dai'ichihoki 2013) (comparing Japan with the UK and Canada); SAKAMAKI, supra note
73 (comparing Japan with the UK and US); Kawashima Izumi, Shosa Kabunushi ni
taisuru Fukosei Shingai K6i-to no Kyasai Seido (1) [The Regime for Relief of Unfairly
Prejudicial Conduct Towards Minority Shareholders (1)], 98 MINSH6Ho ZASSHI 535
(1988) (examining the UK and Canada).
301.

Useful

treatises

include

ROBIN

HOLLINGTON,

HOLLINGTON

ON

SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS ch. 7 (8th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2017) (discussing the unfair
prejudice remedy) and Victor Joffe & Timothy Collingwood, Unfair Prejudice: The
Statutory Remedy, in MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 6
(Victor Joffe, David Drake, Giles Richardson, Daniel Lightman & Timothy Collingwood
eds., 6th ed. Oxford University Press 2018) (same).
302. See, e.g., Maidment v. Attwood [2012] EWCA (Civ) 998, [2013] 2 BCLC 567
[26] (Eng.) (Arden, LJ) ("[A]ctual share values can be adjusted [by the court] to reflect
the effect on the company of all or any wrongs which the wrongdoer respondents have
committed against it"); see also Alan K. Koh, Reconstructing the Reflective Loss Principle,
16 J. CORP. L. STUD. 373, 387-89 (2016) [hereinafter Koh, Reflective Loss Principle]
(noting that courts have taken unfairly prejudicial conduct into account when valuing a
petitioner's shares).
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prejudice remedy. 30 3 As it stands, there is arguably room within the
applicable statutory language of Japan's Kaisha-ho to implement a

3 04
similar system of judicial adjustment.
Third, the usual relief ordered under the unfair prejudice
jurisdiction-an order that the "wrongdoer" member (defendant)
purchase the shares of the aggrieved withdrawing member (plaintiff)has a particular strength: it does not involve any financial outlay by
the company. 3 05 A buyout order targeted at a wrongdoing member

may thus be ordered by the court and on generous valuation terms
(including possible judicial adjustment as discussed above) without

3 06
A potential objection
threatening the company as a going concern.

to implementing a UK-style buyout order may be that there is no clear
statutory language in Japan's Kaisha-ho authorizing the court to
compel any member of a GK (instead of the GK itself) to pay for the
withdrawing member's membership interest. Nevertheless, there is

again opportunity in legislative

silence; in the absence of clear

statutory language prohibiting a court order to pay compensation to be

directed at a wrongdoing co-member, it is still possible to develop a

303. See Koh, Reflective Loss Principle, supra note 302, at 387-89 (illustrating how
accounting for defendants' actions can affect the outcomes of cases involving claims of
unfair prejudice); see also Koh, Shareholder Protection, supra note 283, at ch. III.G.3.ii
(pp. 103-04) (noting, in the context of the UK [and to a lesser extent, the US] that "[n]ot
only would the withdrawing shareholder as a starting point reclaim the value of their
membership interest, they also stand a chance of being compensated for their "share" of
the loss caused to the close corporation by the party responsible for the grounds of
withdrawal ... The Anglo-American approach is more targeted by requiring clear
attribution of fault, but also more powerful from the perspective of minority protection.
It serves a compensatory function as the party at fault is liable to make the victim whole
again.").

304. See Kaisha-h6, [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005. art. 611(2) (Japan)
("Accounting as between the member who has exited and the membership company shall
be conducted on the basis of the company's asset situation as at the time of exit."). If the
wrongdoing party's conduct is also separately actionable by the company under corporate
law or the general law of obligations (contract, tort, or unjust enrichment), it may well
be possible to take those potential claims into account when assessing the company's
"asset situation." Implementing a system of judicial adjustments similar to that of the
UK in the context of a regime where the company (the GK) is required to pay
compensation to the withdrawing member may theoretically impose a greater burden on
the GK. However, this would be alleviated in whole or part by additional incentive for
the GK to recover the value of the additional payout to the withdrawing member by
pursuing claims against wrongdoing members.
305. The "usual relief' is a share buyout order. See supra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text; see also Koh, Shareholder Protection, supra note 283, at ch. III.G.3.ii
(p. 103) ("With the close corporation not usually on the hook, business creditors' interests
are not affected as a matter of corporate law, and thus pose no obstacle to the
withdrawing shareholder's ability to enforce their monetary claim.").
306. Cf. Aizawa & Koriya, supra note 184, at 165 (noting that the withdrawn
member has no choice but to apply for dissolution of the GK and receive a distribution
upon liquidation if the GK's executive member(s) fails to take the necessary steps to pay
the refund). A further benefit of imposing the burden of paying compensation on a
member rather than the GK itself is that any concerns with prejudice to creditors would
be alleviated.
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version of this through decisive judicial action. As it turns out, there is
one jurisdiction-a civil law jurisdiction, in fact-that developed its
withdrawal regime for its leading close corporation entity entirely
without any basis in the statutory text: Germany. 307

3. Germany: Versatile, Judicially Developed Relief for a Wide Range of
Situations
Germany might seem an unlikely candidate for comparative

study, especially since Japan made a deliberate decision to get rid of
the YK 308-a close corporation form descended 309 from the German
GmbH. Nevertheless, the German variant of withdrawal-Austrittaus
wichtigem Grund-isvaluable as it offers a model for the development
of unavoidable grounds in the context of withdrawal from the GK.
Never codified into GmbH legislation, 3 10 withdrawal in Germany

is based on the core concept of "wichtiger Grund." This is a settled
doctrine whereby a GmbH member has the right to withdraw when a
wichtiger Grund-"important reason" or "good cause"-is established;

this wichtiger Grund can be anything that makes it unbearable
(unzumutbar) for the member to remain in the GmbH. 311 Whether a
wichtiger Grund would be recognized in any particular case would turn
on an overall assessment (Gesamtabwdgung) of the respective

circumstances and interests of the parties involved, 31 2 making it a

307.

See infra note 310 and accompanying text.

308. See supra Part II.A; see also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text
(discussing the repeal of the YK Act).
309. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing the influences
contributing to the YK Act).
310.

GOETTE, supra note 35, at 97.

311.

Bundesgerichtshof

[Federal

Court

of

Justice]

Dec.

16,

1991,

ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 116, 359, 369

(Ger.); Peter Ulmer & Mathias Habersack, Anhang f 34 Ausschlieung and Austritt von
Gesellschaftern [Appendix to Section 34: Expulsion and Withdrawal of Members], in
GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (GMBHG):
GROBKOMMENTAR [LAW ON LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATIONS: GRAND COMMENTARY] Rn

51 (Peter Ulmer, Mathias Habersack & Marc L6bbe eds., 2d ed., Mohr Siebeck 2014). An
alternative way of phrasing the test is "unreasonableto expect or require the member to
remain in the GmbH."
312. GERHARD K. BALZ, DIE BEENDIGUNG DER MITGLIEDSCHAFT IN DER GMBH:
EINE EMPIRISCHE UND DOGMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR AUSSCHLIEBUNG UND ZUM
AUSTRITT VON GESELLSCHAFTERN [THE TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE GMBH: AN
EMPIRICAL AND DOCTRINAL STUDY OF EXPULSION AND WITHDRAWAL OF MEMBERS] 106-

07 (Duncker & Humblot 1984) (providing examples); HANS-FRIEDRICH MOLLER, DAs
AUSTRITTSRECHT DES GMBH-GESELLSCHAFTERS [THE GMBH-MEMBER'S WITHDRAWAL

RIGHT] 52 (Carl Heymanns 1996); Lorenz Fastrich, Anhang nach § 34 Ausschluss and
Austritt von Gesellschaftern [Appendix to Section 34: Expulsion and Withdrawal of
Members], in GMBHG: GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER

HAFTUNG [GMBH LAW] Rn 19-20 (Adolf Baumbach & Alfred Hueck eds., 20th ed., C.H.
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powerful yet flexible concept applicable to a wide range of
circumstances. In this regard, wichtiger Grund and unavoidable
grounds are similarly open-textured-and thus versatile-concepts.
Despite the considerable merits of drawing on German doctrine
and scholarship on withdrawal, it is not without its own obstacles.

Although Japan retains, in part, the academic tradition of taking
German corporate law and scholarship seriously, overall German

influence on Japanese corporate law scholarship appears to be
waning. 313 As Takahashi observes, there has been for some years little
direct exchange of ideas between Japanese and German corporate
law.A 14 In the GK context, with the memory of US LLC influence on

the GK as it was originally conceived but not ultimately enacted, as
well as the abolishment of the German GmbH-inspired YK, it may be
unsurprising that the German law-inspired legal scholarship in this
field has been eclipsed by its US-inspired counterpart-especially
among the generation of scholars still actively writing. 315 This is
unfortunate: with no significant body of new cases under the Kaishaho regime immediately at hand, it is more important than ever for
scholars and commentators to draw on foreign law for inspiration and
insight. Yet, those sources are growing increasingly impoverished;
notwithstanding the efforts of a vocal minority in keeping German

corporate law scholarship alive in Japan, the wealth of experience and
knowledge on the GmbH may very well in time be forgotten.

Beck 2013) (providing examples); Christoph H. Seibt, Anhang § 34: Austritt und
AusschlieOung eines Gesellschafters [Appendix to Section 34: Withdrawal and Expulsion
of a Member], in I KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBH-GESETZ [COMMENTARY ON THE GMBH LAW]

Rn 10-13 (Franz Scholz ed., 11th ed., Dr. Otto Schmidt 2012) (providing examples); Lutz
Strohn, § 34 Einziehung von Geschaftsanteilen [Section 34 Redemption of Membership
Interests], in I M0NCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE GESELLSCHAFTEN
MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG - GMBHG [MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE LAW ON LIMITED

LIABILITY CORPORATIONS] Rn 180 (Holger Fleischer & Wulf Goette eds., 3d ed., C.H.
Beck 2018).
313. Takahashi Eiji is one of the few scholars who continue to draw inspiration
from German law when writing on the GK. See, e.g., Eiji Takahashi, "Reception"and
"Convergence"of Japaneseand German CorporateLaw, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 228, 24047 (2015) [hereinafter Takahashi, "Reception"and "Convergence'" (detailing the ways
German and Japanese corporate

law have "grown more similar without

mutual

exchange"); see also Masuda Masaaki & Urakawa Shoji, Godo-Kaisha kara no Sha'in no
Taisha ni kansuru Shomondai [Issues in Member Withdrawalfrom the GK], 58-2/3 KINKI
DAIGAKU HOGAKU 99 (2010).

314.

Takahashi, "Reception" and "Convergence," supra note 313, at 240-47

(observing that Japanese and German corporate law are "converging" in terms of
substantive content due to influence from US law); see also TAKAHASHI EiJi, KAISHA Ho
NO KEIJU To SHfJREN [RECEPTION AND CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE LAW] (Ynhikaku

2016).
315.

See supra note 285 and accompanying text (listing a variety of sources from

leading scholars).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Solutions and insights can come from unexpected places; such is

the case in Japan for close corporation law, the corporate law of the
ordinary (business) people. The lack of withdrawal in Japan's close
corporation forms pre-2005 drew responses that created further
problems. Despite general consensus on the importance of formal
withdrawal remedies and support from the scholarly community,
direct legislative reform efforts in the 1980s went nowhere. Yet,
withdrawal has ultimately entered contemporary Japanese corporate
law, if almost as an afterthought, as part of the new GK. In turn, the
GK is now the only viable Japanese close corporation form with limited
liability for all members offering a member's withdrawal regime.
This new GK withdrawal regime-centered on the open-ended

concept of "unavoidable grounds"-offers members of GKs-and
courts-the possibility of addressing and solving a wide range of
shareholder conflicts with a single, targeted, and powerful remedy. It
is not without its problems, especially when it comes to the withdrawn
member's ability to enforce their entitlement to the refund of their
membership interest. Driven primarily by advocates and specialists in
joint venture law, contemporary discourse on the withdrawal regime,

whether on the scope of "unavoidable grounds" or on valuation
standards, is dominated by the debate on whether the Kaisha-ho
provisions are default or mandatory rules, and, if default, the extent to
which they may be modified by the corporate constitution. Little is

settled at present with only limited jurisprudence of considerable
vintage and not a single post-Kaisha-hojudicial precedent apropos the
GK. The lack of attention devoted to the use of GKs and the withdrawal
regime in non-joint venture contexts further hampers understanding

and development of the law.
The extent to which the GK's popularity and importance would be
impeded by the current legal uncertainty is an open question, although
recent growth trends suggest the presence of significant and growing
enthusiasm for the GK form notwithstanding the difficulties. Close
corporation law in Japan is now at a crossroads; for the first time in

Japanese legal history, participants in closely held businesses may
enjoy both limited liability and possible access to the last and best hope
of a minority participant in unacceptable circumstances-withdrawal.
It is true that the KK remains a popular choice for new businesses

relative to the GK, despite the absence of withdrawal in the former.
This does not diminish in any way the importance of the system of
withdrawal in close corporation law, as the reasons for choosing KKs
have less to do with its intrinsic legal merits or suitability and more to
do with historical familiarity, reputational advantages, and emotional
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considerations.31 6 The dearth of serious legal writing on the GK and
the corresponding lack of awareness among legal practitioners of the

GK's merits are also further obstacles to greater adoption of the GK as
a business vehicle. The fact that GK formations are closing the gap
with the KK despite the absence of a single overwhelming force (such

as federal tax in the US LLC) suggests that, going forward, the KK's
traditional advantages may no longer be sufficient to overcome the
bundle of features offered by the GK-including withdrawal. It
remains to be seen whether Japanese business owners would realizeand capitalize upon-the relative merits offered by the GK with its
withdrawal remedy when choosing how to incorporate, and whether
their legal advisors would recommend the use of withdrawal to obtain

reasonably fair outcomes in situations of intractable shareholder
conflict.
With the law of withdrawal yet to commit itself firmly to any
direction, jurists hold in their grasp a historic opportunity to shape the
future of close corporation law. There is no better time to deploy

comparative corporate law in forging a path ahead for Japanese law,
and there is no better way than for Japan's jurists to first wean
themselves of their fascination with the messy ambivalence that is the
US law on withdrawal in close corporations and LLCs. After all, no
quantity, no matter how high the quality, of scholarship drawing
exclusively on the United States, if any foreign jurisdiction at all, can
overcome the limitations inherent in the monoculture of scholarly
ideas. It is time for mainstream Japanese discourse and the
comparative corporate law community at the international level to
seek out other illuminating guiding lights; this Article has shown that
one needs to look no further than the United Kingdom and Germany

for places to start.

316. See supra Part III.C.3 and Part VI.A (discussing and highlighting the
differences between Japanese corporate forms and their respective characteristics).

